Pich v. Lankford

In Pich v. Lankford, 157 Tex. 335, 302 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. 1957), the one who held the common source of title conveyed 160 acres of land to Turner in a deed containing a reservation of "one half of the full 1/8th Oil Royalty, or a 1/16th of all minerals produced on said land." Id. at 646. Turner conveyed that land to Adams; and Adams conveyed the land to Higgs, reserving "one fourth of all royalty, the same being 1/32 of all oil and gas produced from said land. Id. Higgs conveyed to Howard, who deeded the land to the Sharps, "save and except an undivided three-fourths of the oil, gas and other minerals, on and under said land, which have been heretofore reserved." The Sharps then conveyed the land to the Lankfords "save and except an undivided three-fourths of the oil, gas and other minerals . . ., and an undivided one-fourth of the minerals . . ., which minerals do not belong to the grantors herein." Id. The issue determined by that court involved interpretation of the deed by the Howards to the Sharps and the deed from the Sharps to the Lankfords. The court determined that the deeds conveyed an undivided three-fourths interest in the minerals in place "in plain and unambiguous language" and that the phrases "have heretofore been reserved" and "do not belong to the grantors herein" were simply "recitals which purported to state why the exceptions were made." Id. at 648. Even though the chain of title showed that the recitals were false, the court stated, "The giving of a false reason for an exception from a grant does not operate to alter or cut down the interest or estate excepted, nor does it operate to pass the excepted interest or estate to the grantee." Id. Thus, the court found that the undivided three-fourths interest in the minerals "was excluded from the grants in the Howard and Sharp deeds and title thereto did not pass" to their grantees. Id. at 650. In Pich v. Lankford, no evidence other than prior deeds in the chain of title was offered at trial. The Texas Supreme Court held that both of these save-and-except clauses "except an undivided three-fourths (3/4) interest in the minerals in place in plain and unambiguous language," and rejected arguments that despite the express language excepting a three-fourths interest, the exception was limited to excepting only interests previously reserved. Id. at 340, 302 S.W.2d at 648. The supreme court explained that the following phrases at the end of the deeds' save-and-except clauses--"which have been heretofore reserved" and "do not belong to grantors herein"--were but recitals purporting to state why the exceptions were made. Id., 302 S.W.2d at 648. The chain of title conclusively negated these recitals; a three-fourths interest had not been previously reserved, and a mineral interest did belong to the grantors. Id., 302 S.W.2d at 648. Nonetheless, the supreme court held that " the giving of a false reason for an exception from a grant does not operate to alter or cut down the interest or estate excepted, nor does it operate to pass the excepted interest or estate to the grantee." Id., 302 S.W.2d at 648. Consequently, although the save-and-except clauses at issue in Pich did not reserve an interest in the minerals but merely excepted that interest from the grant, and because the interest did not pass to the grantee and was not outstanding in another, the supreme court held that the legal effect of the save-and-except clauses was to leave the excepted interest in the grantor. Id. at 342, 302 S.W.2d at 650.