In Ramsey v. Ramsey, 19 S.W.3d 548 (Tex.App.--Austin 2000, no pet.h.), the Ramseys separated shortly after the birth of their child and at some point the mother began receiving public assistance. In 1991, the Attorney General filed a suit affecting the parent-child relationship in Williamson County seeking to recover from the father financial aid that the State had paid to the mother on behalf of the child. An agreed judgment was entered in that suit. Roughly a year later, the mother filed for divorce in Navarro County and represented in her pleadings that there were "no court-ordered conservatorships, court-ordered guardianships, or other court-ordered relationships affecting the child." This suit was dismissed for want of prosecution. Some months later, the father petitioned for divorce in Navarro County and he also represented that there was no court of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. When the mother failed to appear for trial, the court entered a default judgment appointing the father sole managing conservator of the child. For the next several years, the father maintained sole custody of the child at all times, but at various points, the mother lived with them. Ultimately, the father and child moved to Plano, and the mother filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in Williamson County. She contended that the 1991 SAPCR order conferred continuing, exclusive jurisdiction in that court such that the conservatorship provisions of the final decree of divorce issued by the Navarro County court were void. The Williamson County suit was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, with that court concluding that continuing jurisdiction had vested in Navarro County. The mother appealed. The appellate court at the outset noted that the 1991 SAPCR order was the product of an action initiated by a third party, the Attorney General, for the purpose of recovering state funds. There was no divorce suit pending at that time and the conservatorship issues were never in contention. "Thus, the issue of conservatorship was merely ancillary to the primary purpose of the State's suit, which was to secure reimbursement of state money." Ramsey, 19 S.W.3d at 551. The court further faulted the mother for failing to challenge the jurisdictional allegations in the father's petition and failing to challenge the validity of the judgment through a motion for new trial, direct appeal, or bill of review. "Rather, appellant allowed the judgment to stand for approximately five years before seeking to have it declared void in a habeas corpus proceeding." Ramsey, 19 S.W.3d at 552. The court then recognized that if a court having potential jurisdiction over a case renders a judgment that is regular on its face and recites that the court's potential jurisdiction has been invoked, the judgment is voidable, not void, and may be set aside only by direct, not collateral, attack. Once the divorce decree, valid on its face, became final and was no longer vulnerable to direct attack, it superseded the 1991 SAPCR order and became the final order with regard to the child's custody and support. . . . It necessarily follows, then, that the Williamson Court was correct in concluding that the Navarro Court is the court of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. Ramsey, 19 S.W.3d at 554. Via footnote, the court opined "that the scheme employed by section 155.001 does not concern true jurisdiction, in the strictest sense of the word. Rather, it is more comparable to dominant jurisdiction or the rules of venue." Ramsey, 19 S.W.3d at 554 n.7.