In Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 335 S.W.3d 126 (Tex. 2010), Barbara Robinson and her husband, John, filed suit against Crown Cork & Seal ("Crown"), alleging that John had contracted mesothelioma from workplace exposure to asbestos products, including products that were manufactured by a corporation with which Crown had merged. Id. at 129. The Robinsons further alleged that Crown had succeeded to this merged corporation's liabilities. Id. During the pendency of the Robinsons' suit, the Texas Legislature enacted Chapter 149 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, "which limited certain corporations' successor liability for asbestos claims." Id. at 130 (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 149.001-.006 (Vernon 2011)). Crown subsequently sought summary judgment, arguing that Chapter 149 barred the Robinsons' claims. Id. at 132-33. In response, the Robinsons argued that the record did not support the application of Chapter 149 or, alternatively, Chapter 149 violated article I, section 16 of the Texas Constitution. Id. at 133. After the trial court granted Crown's summary-judgment motion, John Robinson died. Id. On appeal, Barbara Robinson asserted that Chapter 149 was a retroactive law, prohibited by article I, section 16 of the Texas Constitution, and the legislature had no authority to extinguish her accrued cause of action against Crown. Id. The supreme court, after providing extensive analysis of Texas' vested-rights jurisprudence, explained: "We think our cases establish that the constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws does not insulate every vested right from impairment, nor does it give way to every reasonable exercise of the Legislature's police power; it protects settled expectations that rules are to govern the play and not simply the score, and prevents the abuses of legislative power that arise when individuals or groups are singled out for special reward or punishment." Id. at 145. It then articulated a new test for determining whether a statute violates the prohibition against retroactive laws in article I, section 16 of the Texas Constitution, stating: "Courts must consider three factors in light of the prohibition's dual objectives: the nature and strength of the public interest served by the statute as evidenced by the Legislature's factual findings; the nature of the prior right impaired by the statute; and the extent of the impairment." Id. The court emphasized: "The perceived public advantage of a retroactive law is not simply to be balanced against its relatively small impact on private interests, or the prohibition would be deprived of most of its force. There must be a compelling public interest to overcome the heavy presumption against retroactive laws. To be sure, courts must be mindful that statutes are not to be set aside lightly. This Court has invalidated statutes as prohibitively retroactive in only three cases, all involving extensions of statutes of limitations. But courts must also be careful to enforce the constitutional prohibition to safeguard its objectives." Id. at 145-46. It noted that "changes in the law that merely affect remedies or procedure, or that otherwise have little impact on prior rights, are usually not unconstitutionally retroactive." Id. at 146. In considering the nature of the Robinsons' rights and Chapter 149's impact on those rights, the supreme court recognized that Chapter 149 did not "directly restrict the Robinsons' common law action for personal injuries due to exposure to asbestos in the workplace" but rather "supplanted the usual choice-of-law rules" by mandating that Texas courts apply the Texas law limiting successor liability "even if . . . successor liability arose under the law of another state." Id. at 147. However, the court noted that Chapter 149 extinguished the Robinsons' claims and all other such claims against Crown in Texas and "extinction was the Legislature's specific intent." Id. at 148. It also noted that "an interest in maintaining an established common-law cause of action is greater than an interest in choice-of-law rules." Id. The court further noted that although "an unliquidated claim may have little or no value, as for example when the cause of action has not been recognized or the elements of recovery cannot be proved," the Robinsons' claims constituted "a mature tort," and the court characterized the Robinsons' recovery as "more predictable." Id. The court emphasized that the injury at issue was "mesothelioma," and that such an injury was a "uniquely asbestos-related disease." Id. It also considered the discovery on file that reflected that the "claims had a substantial basis in fact." Id. Because the "the Robinsons could well have expected . . . that a rule of law that permitted their recovery . . . would not be changed after they had filed suit to abrogate their claim," and because Chapter 149 disturbed "settled expectations," the court concluded that Chapter 149 "significantly impacted a substantial interest the Robinsons had in a well-recognized common-law cause of action." Id. at 148-49. Next, in considering the public interest served by Chapter 149, the supreme court stated that the "legislative record was fairly clear that Chapter 149 was enacted to help only Crown and no one else," but yet "the record" supporting the legislation "was silent concerning the number" of asbestos-related claims pending against Crown "or the amount of Crown's probable exposure." Id. at 149. The court rejected Crown's argument that Chapter 149 helped "alleviate the asbestos litigation crisis that has already bankrupted many companies, resulting in lost jobs and a burden on the State's economy" because "the Legislature made no findings to justify Chapter 149." Id. It stated that, contrary to Crown's argument, the legislature had not acknowledged the asbestos litigation crisis in enacting Chapter 149. Id. In contrast, the court noted that the legislature had expressly recognized the asbestos litigation crisis in enacting Chapter 90, the provision at issue here. Id. at 149, n.130. And it pointed out that even the principal sponsor of Chapter 149 had "failed to show how the legislation served a substantial public interest," and the record was unclear as to how the public interest benefitted as a result of Chapter 149. Id. at 149. Thus, the court concluded that the "public interest served by Chapter 149 was slight." Id. at 150. Having concluded that Chapter 149 significantly impacted the Robinsons' substantial interest in a well-recognized common-law cause of action and the public interest served by Chapter 149 was slight, the supreme court held that Chapter 149, as applied to the Robinsons' common-law claims, violated article I, section 16 of the Texas Constitution. Id. The Court specifically noted that the legislature had enacted Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 149, with the specific intent to extinguish pending claims against a single defendant. See 335 S.W.3d at 148. The court also noted that, at the time the legislature enacted Chapter 149, the Robinsons had already filed suit. See id. at 130. Thus, in Robinson, Chapter 149 operated to strip litigants of their right to pursue "mature" claims that were already filed and pending. See id. at 148. The court also characterized the Robinsons' recovery as "more predictable," emphasizing that the injury at issue was "mesothelioma," such an injury was a "uniquely asbestos-related disease," and the record evidence reflected that the "claims had a substantial basis in fact." Id.