Schneider National Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. 2004), was a multi-party suit brought by resi-dents living near the Houston ship channel complaining of conditions created by nearby industrial plants. The plaintiffs alleged air contaminants, odors, lights, and noise from the plants interfered with the use and enjoyment of their properties. The court did not address the issue of whether air contaminants, odors, light, and noise could constitute a trespass but, instead, side-stepped that issue by procedurally disposing of the claim while "assuming that entry of photons, particles, or sound waves can constitute a trespass." Id. at 292. The Texas Supreme Court clarified the test for determining whether a nuisance is permanent or temporary, and the court conducted a comprehensive analysis of the distinctions between permanent and temporary nuisances. 147 S.W.3d 264. Whether a nuisance is permanent turns on expectations about its impact over a period of years. Id. at 276. A nuisance is permanent if it is "constant and continuous," if injury "constantly and regularly recurs," and if future harm can reasonably be predicted and evaluated. Id. at 272, 278. A permanent nuisance may also be established by "showing that either the plaintiff's injuries or the defend-ant's operations are permanent." Id. at 283. Conversely, a nuisance is temporary "only if it is so irregular or intermittent over the period leading up to filing and trial that future injury cannot be estimated with reasonable certainty." Id. at 281. The supreme court held that a nuisance is "permanent" if it is sufficiently constant or regular, no matter how long between occurrences, that the future impact on the property can be reasonably evaluated. A cause of action for a permanent injury accrues when the injury first occurs or is discovered. By contrast, when the future impact of the nuisance is speculative because it is so irregular or intermittent that future in-jury cannot be estimated with reasonable certainty, the nuisance is considered "temporary," the continuing tort doctrine applies, and the plaintiff is permitted to assert a new claim each time the nuisance occurs. Id. at 281. The supreme court clarified the application of the longstanding distinction in Texas law between "permanent" and "temporary" nuisances for purposes of determining accrual. See Bates, 147 S.W.3d at 270-75. Under this rule, "a permanent nuisance claim accrues when injury first occurs or is discovered," while "a temporary nuisance claim accrues anew upon each injury." Id. at 270. The distinction has been said to turn on "whether a nuisance is constant, regular, and likely to continue or whether it is sporadic, uncertain, and likely to end," but courts had struggled with the application of these concepts. See id. at 272-75. The supreme court in Bates refocused the inquiry on the consequences that flowed from the perma-nent-temporary distinction, particularly the types of damages recoverable for each type of nuisance. See id. at 275-80. With temporary nuisances, it observed, the landowner may recover only lost use and enjoyment (measured in terms of rental value) that has already accrued, while the landowner could recover lost market value for permanent nuisances--"a figure that reflects all losses from the injury, including lost rents expected in the future." Id. at 276. These considerations, the court reasoned, provided a standard of reference for applying the concepts of "permanent" vs. "temporary" or "constant" vs. "sporadic" nuisances: whether "injury occurs often enough before trial that jurors can make a reasonable estimate of the long-term impact of the nuisance on the market value of a property." Id. at 276-77. Thus, the supreme court explained, Based on these considerations, we hold that the traditional Texas distinction between temporary and permanent nuisances should be applied using the same standard of reference that applies to the consequences flowing from it. Thus, if a nuisance occurs several times in the years leading up to a trial and is likely to continue, jurors will generally have enough evidence of frequency and duration to reasonably evaluate its impact on neighboring property values. In such cases, the nuisance should be treated as permanent, even if the exact dates, frequency, or extent of future damage remain unknown. Conversely, a nuisance as to which any future impact remains speculative at the time of trial must be deemed "temporary." . . . This standard should distinguish temporary and permanent nuisances in most cases. Generally, if a nuisance occurs at least a few times a year and appears likely to continue, property values will begin to reflect that impact, and jurors should be able to evaluate it with reasonable certainty. Even if a nui-sance causes annoyance only during certain weather conditions or certain months, annual experience should provide a sufficient basis for evaluating the nuisance. Absent evidence that current experienc-es are unrepresentative or about to change, such nuisances should be considered "permanent" as a matter of law. (Id. at 280.) The supreme court added "that a nuisance should be deemed temporary only if it is so irregular or intermit-tent over the period leading up to filing and trial that future injury cannot be estimated with reasonable cer-tainty," and permanent "if it is sufficiently constant or regular (no matter how long between occurrences) that future impact can be reasonably evaluated." Id. at 281. "Jurors should be asked to settle the question only to the extent there is a dispute regarding what interfer-ence has occurred or whether it is likely to continue." Id. The supreme court in Bates also addressed whether the focus of the permanent-temporary inquiry is proper-ly the source of the nuisance (the "sending end") or the resultant injury (the "receiving end). See id. at 282. It concluded that generally a nuisance is permanent when either the defendant's source or the plaintiff's inju-ries made it so, as "in most nuisance cases, a permanent source will result in permanent interference." Id. at 283. But this "presumption of a connection between the two," the court added, "can be rebutted by evidence that a defendant's . . . operations cause injury only under circumstances so rare that, even when they occur, it remains uncertain whether or to what degree they may ever occur again." Id.