In State v. Villarreal, No. PD-0306-14, 2014 WL 6734178 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 26, 2014), the suspect was stopped for a traffic violation. As the suspect exhibited signs of intoxication, a DWI investigation was conducted. Id. The suspect refused to perform standardized field sobriety tests and refused to provide a blood specimen. Id. After the officer discovered that the suspect had been convicted of DWI on several occasions, the suspect's blood was drawn over his objection based on section 724.012(b) of the Texas Transportation Code. The suspect then moved to suppress the blood test results and the trial court granted the motion. Id. On review to the court of criminal appeals, the State argued that the court of appeals erred in holding that a warrantless blood draw conducted pursuant to the provisions of the transportation code violates the Fourth Amendment. The court of criminal appeals rejected the State's contention that the implied-consent and mandatory blood draw provisions established a constitutionally valid basis for conducting a nonconsensual search in the absence of a search warrant. Id. In State v. Villarreal, an officer initiated a traffic stop and in questioning the driver, found him to have slurred speech, red, watery eyes, and the strong smell of alcohol. The driver refused to take the standard field sobriety tests. Id. When a background check showed the driver had several prior DWI convictions, the arresting officer took the driver to a hospital for a blood draw, despite the driver's non-consent. The officer viewed the Transportation Code as mandating the blood draw, and while he "could have" obtained a warrant, he believed that the statute made a warrant unnecessary. Id. The trial court in Villarreal held the blood draw improper. The court of appeals affirmed and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals squarely confronted the State's implied consent argument under the Transportation Code. It also addressed the State's alternative arguments that the automobile, search incident to arrest, and special needs exceptions to the Fourth Amendment applied. Lastly the court addressed the State's claim that a general Fourth Amendment balancing test could justify the involuntary blood draw. The Court rejected each of the State's proffered basis for the blood draw, concluding: "We hold that the provisions in the Transportation Code do not, taken by themselves, form a constitutionally valid alternative to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. We thus reject the State's assertion that a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw conducted pursuant to those provisions can fall under one of the established exceptions to the warrant requirement described above, and we further reject the State's suggestion that such a search may be upheld under a general Fourth Amendment balancing test."