In Sterling Trust Co. v. Adderley, 168 S.W.3d 835, 842 (Tex. 2005), the Supreme Court of Texas clarified that the Texas Securities Act ("TSA") section 33F contains a "general awareness" requirement. It concluded that a plaintiff must prove that an aider was aware of the primary violator's improper activities before the alleged aider may be held liable for assisting in the securities violation, even when the aider is alleged to have acted with only "reckless disregard for the truth or the law." Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court recognized, "When the Texas Legislature adopted the aider provision of the TSA, it explicitly stated that aider liability should be imposed 'only if the aider has the requisite scienter.'" Id. at 842 (citing Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 581-33, Comment--1977 Amendment). The court explained that "federal courts have typically used the term 'general awareness' as a shorthand to describe actual awareness of general wrongdoing." See id at 841 n.3. The Sterling Trust court cited Gould v. American--Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 779-80 (3d Cir. 1976), in which the Third Circuit explained that "the required knowledge of the act has been defined as a 'general awareness (on the part of the aider and abettor) that his role was part of an overall activity that is improper'" and that "the proof offered must establish conscious involvement in impropriety or constructive notice of intended impropriety." Id. at 840. The court also cited Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dall., 522 F.2d 84, 96 (5th Cir. 1975) in which the Fifth Circuit stated that "the postman who mails a fraudulent letter is not covered by the Act, nor is the company that manufactured the paper on which the violating documents are printed," rather "the proof must demonstrate actual awareness of the party's role in the fraudulent scheme." Id. at 840-41. The Sterling Trust court disagreed with the court in Goldstein v. Mortenson, 113 S.W.3d 769, 777 (Tex. App.--Austin 2003, no pet.), which stated that a "failure to conduct minimal investigation and inquiry" before rendering assistance with a securities transaction can suffice to create liability under the "reckless disregard." Id. at 841. Relying on United States Supreme Court case law, the Texas supreme court further concluded that, "the TSA's scienter requirement of 'reckless disregard for the truth or the law' is similarly intended to impose a requirement of 'recklessness in its subjective form,' and this recklessness must be directly related to the primary violator's securities violation." Id. at 842 (citing Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999)). The court ultimately held that "an alleged aider can only be held liable if it rendered assistance 'in the face of a perceived risk' that its assistance would facilitate untruthful or illegal activity by the primary violator." Id. at 842 (citing Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 581-33(F)(2); Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536, 119 S. Ct. at 2125). "In order to perceive such a risk, the alleged aider must possess a 'general awareness that his role was part of an overall activity that is improper.'" Id.