Telthorster v. Tennell

In Telthorster v. Tennell, 92 S.W.3d 457, 45 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 948 (Tex. 2002), the Texas Supreme Court enunciated the good-faith standard to be applied when a police officer is sued for injuries inflicted during an arrest. Id. at 459. Noting that its approach to good faith has been shaped by "a desire to avoid overdeterrence of energetic law enforcement," the court considered the balance to be struck between the competing interests of unflinching law enforcement and the right of citizens to recover for injuries caused by unreasonable conduct. Id. at 463-64. The court found that the inherent risks to the general public previously considered in cases involving high-speed chases are not implicated in cases involving injuries during an arrest. Id. at 464. Official immunity's underlying purpose to encourage energetic law enforcement is most salient in the context of street-level police work, which frequently requires quick and decisive action in the face of volatile and changing circumstances. Id. During arrest situations, officers routinely are forced to make split-second judgments in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving. Id. Arresting officers often confront at close range suspects whose violent intentions and capabilities may not be readily apparent. Id. A high risk of liability would likely compel arresting officers to act hesitantly when immediate action is required, subjecting themselves and the public to unnecessary risks. Id. Based on these policy considerations, the court held that when an officer is engaged in an arrest that results in injury to the suspect, a particularized need/risk assessment is not compelled in light of official immunity's overriding purpose to reduce the threat that civil liability may deter arresting officers from acting with the decisiveness and judgment required by the public good. Id. The court formulated the following good faith test: the defendant must show that a reasonably prudent officer, under the same or similar circumstances, could have believed that his or her conduct was justified based on the information he possessed when the conduct occurred. Telthorster, 92 S.W.3d at 465. The defendant need not prove that it would have been unreasonable not to engage in the conduct, or that all reasonably prudent officers would have engaged in the same conduct. Id. Rather, he must prove only that a reasonably prudent officer, under similar circumstances, might have reached the same decision. Id. That the defendant was negligent will not defeat good faith; this test does not inquire into "what a reasonable person would have done," but into what a "reasonable officer could have believed." Id. Once the officer meets that burden, the plaintiff must do more than show that a reasonably prudent officer could have reached a different decision. Id. Instead, the plaintiff must offer evidence that no reasonable officer in that position could have believed that the facts justified the conduct. Id. If officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, the officer acted in good faith as a matter of law. Id.