In Temple-Inland Products Corp. v. Carter, 993 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. 1999), the plaintiffs, Carter and Wilson, were employees of an independent contractor hired by Temple-Inland to drill holes in laboratory countertops to install electrical outlets. Carter, 993 S.W.2d at 89. The plaintiffs did not know, and were not initially told by Temple-Inland, that the countertops and the dust produced by the drilling contained asbestos fibers. Id. Carter and Wilson did not wear any kind of protective gear during their work. Id. Carter worked from four to six weeks and Wilson worked two weeks before the laboratory manager warned them of the asbestos. Id. Carter and Wilson then stopped work on the project. Id. Carter and Wilson sued Temple-Inland for mental anguish damages because it negligently exposed them to asbestos fibers. Id. Their expert witness, Dr. Jenkins, testified that neither Carter nor Wilson had any asbestos-related disease. Carter, 993 S.W.2d at 89-90. Carter complained of shortness of breath upon exertion, but his lung x-rays were normal. Carter, 993 S.W.2d at 89. Wilson had some pleural thickening, and also complained of shortness of breath, but his symptoms could have been related to his obesity. Id. Dr. Jenkins did not attribute any of their reported symptoms to their exposure to asbestos, and agreed that the exposure was probably too recent, given the long latent period normally associated with asbestos-related disease, to have caused any symptoms. Carter, 993 S.W.2d at 89-90. Dr. Jenkins insisted, however, that Carter and Wilson had been injured by their exposure to asbestos and probable inhalation of asbestos fibers. Id. He estimated their risk of developing a disease had increased from one in 1,000,000 to about one in 500,000 for the next ten to fifteen years, and as much as one in 100 over twenty or thirty years. Carter, 993 S.W.2d at 90. Temple-Inland moved for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs had not suffered any injury for which they could recover mental anguish damages, arguing that their claims amounted to nothing more than negligent infliction of emotional distress, a cause of action that is not recognized in Texas. Id.; see Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 597 (Tex. 1993). In reversing the decision of the Beaumont court of appeals and upholding the trial court's granting of summary judgment, the supreme court stated: it has been established for over a century that a person who is placed in peril by the negligence of another, but who escapes without injury, may not recover damages simply because he has been placed in a perilous position. Nor is mere fright the subject of damages. Absent physical injury, the common law has not allowed recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress except in certain specific, limited instances. There are few situations in which a claimant who is not physically injured by the defendant's breach of a duty may recover mental anguish damages. See, e.g., Freeman v. City of Pasadena, 744 S.W.2d 923, 923-24 (Tex. 1988) (bystander recovery); Silcott v. Oglesby, 721 S.W.2d 290, 292 (Tex. 1986) (intentional tort of child abduction); Leyendecker & Assocs. v. Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369, 374 (Tex. 1984) (defamation); Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858, 860-61 (Tex. 1973) (invasion of privacy); Stuart v. Western Union Tel. Co., 66 Tex. 580, 18 S.W. 351, 353 (failure of telegraph company to timely deliver death message); Pat H. Foley & Co. v. Wyatt, 442 S.W.2d 904, 906-07 (Tex. App.--Houston 14th Dist. 1969, writ ref'd) (negligent handling of corpse). Whether a plaintiff can recover mental anguish damages without physical injury "depends on both the nature of the duty breached and the quality of proof offered by the plaintiff. For many breaches of legal duties, even tortious ones, the law affords no right to recover for resulting mental anguish." (Carter, 993 S.W.2d at 91.) The court held that because Carter's and Wilson's claims did not fall within any category in which such recovery had been allowed, they could not recover mental anguish damages absent physical injury. Carter, 993 S.W.2d at 91. Carter and Wilson argued alternatively that they had been injured because there was uncontradicted summary judgment evidence they had inhaled and were injured by asbestos fibers in the laboratory. Id. The supreme court held it had to assume, based on the summary judgment evidence, that Carter and Wilson reasonably feared developing an asbestos-related disease at some point in the future. Carter, 993 S.W.2d at 92. However, the court framed the issue as whether, under these circumstances, the plaintiffs could recover mental anguish damages for their increased risk and reasonable fear of possibly developing asbestos-related diseases that they did not currently have and might never have. Id. Finding they could not, the court stated: While the existence of physical injury is ordinarily necessary for recovery of mental anguish damages except in those instances already mentioned, such injury may not be sufficient for recovery of mental anguish damages when the injury has not produced disease, despite a reasonable fear that such disease will develop. As we recently observed in . . . Likes, "without intent or malice on the defendant's part, serious bodily injury to the plaintiff, or a special relationship between the two parties, we permit recovery of mental anguish in only a few types of cases involving injuries of such a shocking and disturbing nature that mental anguish is a highly foreseeable result. . . . . . The difficulty in predicting whether exposure to asbestos will cause any disease and if so, what disease, and the long latency period characteristic of asbestos-related diseases, make it very difficult for judges and juries to evaluate which exposure claims are serious and which are not. . . . If recovery were allowed in the absence of present disease, individuals might feel obliged to bring suit for such recovery prophylactically, against the possibility of future consequences from what is now an inchoate risk. This would exacerbate not only the multiplicity of suits but the unpredictability of results. The question is not, of course, whether Carter and Wilson have themselves suffered genuine distress over their own exposure. We assume they have, and that their anxiety is reasonable. The question, rather, is whether this type of claim -- for fear of an increased risk of developing an asbestos-related disease when no disease is presently manifest -- should be permitted, regardless of any individual plaintiff's circumstances, when the effort in determining the genuineness of each claim and assuring appropriate recovery is beset with the difficulties we have described. We conclude that no such action should be recognized. . . . . . We add this cautionary note. The principles we have used to deny recovery of mental anguish damages for fear of the possibility of developing a disease as a result of an exposure to asbestos may not yield the same result when the exposure is to some other dangerous or toxic element. Exposure to asbestos, a known carcinogen, is never healthy but fortunately does not always result in disease . . . The substantial uncertainty that exposure to asbestos will ultimately result in disease, even though the risk of disease is significantly increased, and the ordinarily long latency period before disease develops counsel strongly against compensating these types of fears. The consequences of exposure to other toxic materials vary, and while the analysis in other circumstances should by the same as that which we have employed here, the outcomes may be different. (Carter, 993 S.W.2d at 92-95.)