In Wiley v. State, 74 S.W.3d 399 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 949 (2002), the defendant was charged with burning down his own restaurant. 74 S.W.3d at 403, 405. Wiley sought to introduce evidence that another person, a known "fire-starter," had been ejected from the restaurant a few days prior to the fire for acting crazy, striking matches, and removing his shirt. Id. He also wanted to present evidence that the "fire-starter" was seen across the street from the restaurant when it burned. Id. at 405. The record, however, showed this alleged alternative perpetrator likely lacked the intellectual capacity to plan and execute the fire. Id. at 404. So, Wiley instead sought to raise the possibility this third person may have acted in concert with another arsonist. Id. at 407. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded the trial court properly excluded Wiley's proffered evidence under Texas Rule of Evidence 403. See id.; Tex. R. Evid. 403. The court explained admission of the speculative alternative-perpetrator evidence "would have forced the State to attempt to disprove the nebulous allegation that perhaps the other individual was somehow involved as an assistant to some unknown sophisticated arsonist." Wiley, 74 S.W.3d at 407. Such evidence would have resulted in a "side trial," turning the jury's focus away from deciding the only issue in the case?whether Wiley had set the fire--and toward speculating whether an individual who was not on trial may have been guilty. Id. In Wiley v. State, the appellant, who was charged with arson, argued that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that a known "fire-starter," who had been ejected a few days earlier from the restaurant that burned, stood across the street watching it burn. Id. The appellant asserted that, although this known "fire-starter" did not have the intellectual capacity to "set this sophisticated fire," he may have assisted someone else in starting the fire. Id. at 406. The appellant argued that "had the jury been permitted to hear evidence that another person could have committed the offense, they might have entertained a reasonable doubt as to Appellant's guilt." Id. at 405. Holding that the trial court did not err in excluding the evidence under Rule of Evidence 403, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated: In weighing probative value against Rule 403 counterfactors, courts must be sensitive to the special problems presented by "alternative perpetrator" evidence. Although a defendant obviously has a right to attempt to establish his innocence by showing that someone else committed the crime, he still must show that his proffered evidence regarding the alleged alternative perpetrator is sufficient, on its own or in combination with other evidence in the record, to show a nexus between the crime charged and the alleged "alternative perpetrator." Id. at 406. The Wiley court determined that the evidence suggesting another individual started the fire was "both meager and speculative." Id. The court concluded that, even if the evidence was marginally relevant, it could not survive the Rule 403 balancing test. Id. at 407. The court explained that the probative value of the evidence was slight because it was speculative. Id. Further, the evidence "presented a great threat of 'confusion of the issues' because it would have forced the State to attempt to disprove the nebulous allegation" that some other person was involved as an assistant to an unknown arsonist in burning down the restaurant. Id. Such evidence would have resulted in a "side trial," turning the jury's focus away from deciding the only issue in the case--whether Wiley had set the fire--and toward speculating whether an individual who was not on trial may have been guilty. Id. The court concluded, "It is not sufficient for a defendant merely to offer up unsupported speculation that another person may have done the crime. Such speculative blaming intensifies the grave risk of jury confusion, and it invites the jury to render its findings based on emotion or prejudice." Id. The appellant tried to introduce evidence suggesting that someone else might have started the fire, but the evidence presented amounted to no more than unsupported speculation. Id. at 408. The court upheld the trial court's exclusion of such evidence based upon Texas Rules of Evidence Rule 403, absent proof that the alternative perpetrator committed some act directly connecting him or her to the charged offense. Id. at 406. Subsequently, after noting that such evidence could not withstand the Rule 403 balancing test because its probative value was slight and it presented a great threat of confusion of the issues, the court stated that it also presented a threat of "unfair prejudice" by inviting the jury to blame an absent, unrepresented, incompetent person for an arson when there was not a scintilla of evidence that he was actually involved. Id. at 407. In Wiley v. State, the defendant argued the that the trial court denied him his constitutional right to present a defense when it excluded portions of his sworn statement to an insurance investigator and testimony by a witness that a different person might have had some involvement in committing the arson for which he was convicted. 74 S.W.3d at 401. He argued that he should have been allowed to present evidence that a known fire-starter was thrown out of the restaurant a few days prior to the fire and was standing across the street as the restaurant burned. Id. at 405. Essentially, Wiley attempted to present an "alternate perpetrator" theory. Id. at 406. But the court found that he did not meet his burden of showing a nexus between the crime charged and the alleged alternative perpetrator. Id. at 406. The court found the evidence both "meager and speculative." Id. Even assuming that the evidence had some marginal relevance, it could not survive the balancing test under Rule 403. Id. at 407. Because the evidence was highly speculative, the probative value was slight. Id. Instead, the evidence created a threat of "confusion of the issues," and "unfair prejudice." Id. The court found that the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in excluding the alternative perpetrator testimony under Rule 403. Id. at 408. The Court held that alternative perpetrator evidence may be admitted to establish a defendant's innocence by showing that someone else committed the crime. Wiley, 74 S.W.3d at 406. But the defendant still must show that this proffered evidence is sufficient, on its own or in combination with other evidence in the record, to show a nexus between the crime charged and the alleged "alternative perpetrator." Id. Although it is unclear exactly how much evidence is necessary to sufficiently prove a nexus between the offense and allegedly guilty third party, Texas jurisprudence is clear that evidence of third party guilt is inadmissible if it is mere speculation that another person may have committed the offense. Id. at 406-08. Such speculative blaming intensifies the grave risk of jury confusion, and it invites the jury to render its findings based on emotion or prejudice. Id. The Court held that erroneous evidentiary rulings rarely rise to the level of denying the fundamental constitutional rights to present a meaningful defense. The two distinct scenarios in which rulings excluding evidence might rise to the level of a constitutional violation are: (1) a state evidentiary rule which categorically and arbitrarily prohibits the defendant from offering otherwise relevant, reliable evidence which is vital to his defense; and (2) a trial court's clearly erroneous ruling excluding otherwise relevant, reliable evidence which forms such a vital portion of the case that exclusion effectively precludes the defendant from presenting a defense. Id. In this second scenario, the rule itself is appropriate, but the trial court erroneously applies the rule to exclude admissible evidence to such an extent that it effectively prevents the defendant from presenting his defensive theory. Id. In Wiley, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals discussed whether the trial court's application of Rule 403 rose to the level of denying the appellant's fundamental constitutional right to present a meaningful defense. 74 S.W.3d at 405-06. Under Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, a trial court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues. TEX. R. EVID. 403. The Wiley court noted that in weighing probative value against Rule 403 counterfactors, courts must be sensitive to the special problems presented by "alternative perpetrator" evidence. 74 S.W.3d at 406. "Although a defendant obviously has a right to attempt to establish his innocence by showing that someone else committed the crime, he must still show that his proffered evidence regarding the alleged alternative perpetrator is sufficient, on its own or in combination with other evidence in the record, to show a nexus between the crime charged and the alleged 'alternative perpetrator.'" Id. "Although it is unclear exactly how much evidence is necessary to sufficiently prove a nexus between the offense and allegedly guilty third party, Texas jurisprudence is clear that evidence of third party guilt is inadmissible if it is mere speculation that another person may have committed the offense." Id.