In AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000), a group of insurance companies invested approximately $150 million in the securities of JWP, Inc., pursuant to note purchase agreements. In purchasing the notes, the insurance companies relied upon JWP, Inc.'s production of past and ongoing financial statements, which were certified by the defendant accounting firm, Ernst & Young. The financial statements were consistently inaccurate, and after a series of aggressive acquisitions, JWP, Inc. was unable to continue paying interest on the notes. JWP, Inc. defaulted and was placed in involuntary bankruptcy. The insurance companies sued Ernst & Young for fraud, and after a bench trial, the district court dismissed plaintiffs' fraud claim for failure to show loss causation. Specifically, the trial court concluded that JWP, Inc.'s insolvency and default on the notes were caused by the financial troubles of one of the companies it acquired, and a market downturn generally, not because of "'the fiscal infirmities concealed by JWP's annual reports.'" AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 119 F. Supp. 2d 394, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). On appeal, the Second Circuit issued a three-opinion decision, vacating and remanding on the issue of loss causation, because the circumstances permitted varying inferences as to whether the investors would have waived JWP Inc.'s defaults and allowed the aggressive acquisition strategy to proceed had JWP, Inc. known the company's true financial condition. On remand, the trial court again dismissed the complaint, finding that "plaintiffs' loss on their investments in JWP's notes was not a foreseeable result of Ernst & Young's complicity in JWP's misrepresentations but of post-audit developments that could not have been anticipated." Id. at 407. The plaintiffs again appealed on the issue of loss causation. The Second Circuit acknowledged that its "previous decision with respect to this litigation generated three divergent opinions, each therefore without binding precedential effect." AUSA Life Ins. Co., 39 Fed App'x 667, 669 (2d Cir. 2002) (AUSA Life II). In any event, in AUSA Life II, the Second Circuit made clear that "the plaintiffs were required to demonstrate that, with the information available at the time, it is more probable than not that they would have exercised their options in a way that would have ultimately obviated their losses." Id. at 672. The Court held that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy this burden, reiterating its prior conclusion that "what the plaintiffs and JWP would have done had the defendant revealed the defaults . . . involved pure speculation." Id. (reaching same conclusion on "enabling theory" and "forebearance theory").