In Cunningham Bros., Inc. v. Bail, 407 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 959 (1969), a general contractor filed a federal court declaratory judgment action against a masonry subcontractor and several of its employees who were injured when a scaffold collapsed. Some of the employees had brought state court personal injury suits, under the Illinois Structural Work Act, but others had not. The general contractor sought a declaration that it did not "have charge of" the work being performed by the employees at the job site, within the meaning of the pertinent statute, and therefore none of the employees had a cause of action for personal injuries against it under that statute. The general contractor maintained that the declaratory judgment action would serve a useful purpose because "instead of having to wait and be sued in different state and federal forums by the various injured parties, . . . it could bring them together in one action . . . ." 407 F.2d at 1167. The federal district court declined jurisdiction, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that, "regarding the individual declaratory judgment defendants, we are of the opinion that to compel potential personal injury plaintiffs to litigate their claims at a time and in a forum chosen by the alleged tortfeasor would be a perversion of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act." 407 F.2d at 1167. It observed that the primary purpose of the federal act, "'to avoid accrual of avoidable damages to one not certain of his rights and to afford him an early adjudication without waiting until his adversary should see fit to begin suit, after damage had accrued,'" is not advanced when damages have accrued and the declaratory judgment action merely is a substitute for "the traditional procedures for adjudicating negligence cases," with the parties' roles being reversed. Id. at 1167-68. The court explained: To so reverse the roles of the parties would affect more than merely the form of action, but would jeopardize those procedures which the law has traditionally provided to injured parties by which to seek judicial relief. Although "the existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate," Rule 57, Fed. Rules Civil Proc., we hold that such relief is inappropriate in the instant case since "more effective relief can and should be obtained in another procedure . . . ." 407 F.2d at 1168