In Diaz v. Federal Express Corp. (C.D. Cal. 2005) 373 F. Supp. 2d 1034, the defendant claimed the plaintiff suffered from a temporary disability under the FEHA and sought to have the federal district court apply a categorical exclusion based on the short duration of the condition. (Id. at pp. 1047-1048.) The district court in Diaz rejected that effort, concluding that neither under the ADA nor the FEHA were temporary disabilities excluded as a matter of law. (Ibid.) To that end, the Diaz court concluded: "based on a simple reading of the statute, it appears that the California Legislature did not categorically exclude temporary disabilities, as Defendant would have the Court conclude. To the contrary, the Legislature appears to have included temporary disabilities within its broad definitions of 'disability.'" (Id. at p. 1048.) In Diaz, the plaintiff was diagnosed with an "adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood" and had several bouts with depression, anxiety. (Id. at pp. 1040-1044.) Thereafter, the Diaz court went on to examine the "weight" to be given to the duration of a condition in assessing whether a person is disabled. After concluding that none of the California case law nor the FEHA spoke to with the issue, the Diaz court undertook an examination of the Legislative history of the 2001 amendments to the FEHA. (Id. at pp. 1049-1052.) The Legislative history did not address the durational issue and thus the parties in Daiz were left to argue inferences from the silence: the defendant argued that the silence meant the Legislature did not intend to deviate from the ADA on the issue, while the plaintiff asserted the failure to address duration meant that the Legislature did not intend duration to be a factor in the determination of whether a person is disabled. (Id. at p. 1051.) The Diaz court agreed with the plaintiff: "Since the Legislature did not choose to include duration as a factor, and since the FEHA definition of 'disability' is intended to be broader than the ADA definition, the Legislature did not intend for duration to be a factor in determining whether a plaintiff is disabled for purposes of the FEHA. . . . Defendant has certainly not put forth sufficient evidence to establish that the Legislature intended to institute a durational requirement in establishing that a defendant is disabled under the FEHA." (Id. at p. 1052.) This notwithstanding, the district court in Diaz also acknowledged removing duration from consideration might mean every person who suffered a cold, the flu or a degree of stress or depression (that most workers experience) would be considered "disabled" under the FEHA and this might be an "absurd result." Nonetheless, the Diaz court stated: ". . . the mere fact that a statute is 'absurd' does not preclude a finding that it is what the Legislature intended, . . ." (Id. at pp. 1052-1053.) The court also observed that the jury would still be required to make a determination of whether an employee's cold, stress or flu "limited" a major life activity and that some conditions might be so "minor" as to not constitute such a limitation. (Id. at p. 1053.)