The federal courts have concluded that claims contesting the computation of criminal sentences should continue to be treated as traditional collateral proceedings under habeas corpus, since they were not the type of civil lawsuits Congress meant to discourage or restrict. In Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752 (3rd Cir. 1996), the Third Circuit explained: The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) applies to prisoners who bring a "civil action" or who appeal a judgment in a "civil action or proceeding." 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(2), (b). But the PLRA neither defines "civil action" for purposes of in forma pauperis litigants nor expressly excludes habeas corpus proceedings from its scope. We do not believe, however, that the meaning of the phrase "civil action" as used in the PLRA is plain. First, habeas corpus cases are, in effect, hybrid actions whose nature is not adequately captured by the phrase "civil action" . . . . . . . Congress enacted the PLRA primarily to curtail claims brought by prisoners under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Federal Torts Claims Act, most of which concern prison conditions and many of which are routinely dismissed as legally frivolous. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-378, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (The PLRA "limits the remedies for prison condition lawsuits."); 141 CONG. REC. S14418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (The PLRA will limit frivolous "prison condition lawsuits," such as a prisoner who "sued demanding that he be issued Reebok . . . instead of Converse brand shoes."). Furthermore, when the PLRA is read as a whole, it is apparent that Congress did not intend for the statute to apply to habeas proceedings. Id. at 754-56.