In Douds v. International Longshoremen's Association, (2 Cir., 1957) 241 F.2d 278, the court pointed out that there was a clear distinction between 'private bargaining over conditions of employment and administrative determination of the unit appropriate for bargaining': 'The parties cannot bargain meaningfully about wages or hours or conditions of employment unless they know the unit of bargaining. That question is for the Board to decide on a petition under Section 9(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, and its decision is conclusive on the parties, although the decision may subsequently be changed.' 241 F.2d at 282. The court further declared that the only process of changing the appropriate bargaining unit 'not permitted by the Act is one that denies the Board this ultimate control of the bargaining unit and disrupts the bargaining unit itself. This is precisely what occurs when, after the Board has decided what the appropriate bargaining unit is, one party over the objection of the other demands a change in that unit. Such a demand interferes with the required bargaining 'with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and conditions of employment' in a manner excluded by the Act. It is thus a refusal to bargain in good faith .' Id., 241 F.2d at 283.