The central question in regard to federal pre-emption is whether "state law conflicts with the provisions of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 or operates to frustrate its objects." Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 841, 138 L. Ed. 2d 45, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997). Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974's general pre-emption clause, 29 U.S.C. 1144 (a), provides that the Act "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . . . ." "Initially, the Supreme Court interpreted Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974's pre-emption statute as creating a 'deliberately expansive' pre-emption of state law." Emard v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 153 F.3d 949, 953 (9th Cir. 1998). "Recently, 'the Court has come to recognize that Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 pre- emption must have limits when it enters areas traditionally left to state regulation.'" Id. Domestic relations is an area of law usually governed by state law, and general legislation enacted by Congress rarely attempts to displace the authority of the state in this area. Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 587, 104 L. Ed. 2d 675, 109 S. Ct. 2023 (1989). "On the rare occasion when state family law has come into conflict with a federal statute, the United States Supreme Court has limited review under the Supremacy Clause to a determination whether Congress has 'positively required by direct enactment' that state law be pre[-]empted." Rahn v. Rahn, 914 P.2d 463, 465 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 95 L. Ed. 2d 599, 107 S. Ct. 2029 (1987)). Moreover, 29 U.S.C. 1056 (d)(3)(B)(i)(1) of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 expressly defers to state domestic relations law to define a spouse's property rights in the event of divorce. Because we conclude that the District of Columbia's marital property law, that recognizes the waiver of a spouse's potential property interest upon divorce pursuant to a valid prenuptial agreement is consistent with Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, we need not engage in a traditional pre-emption analysis. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 was passed by Congress as a federal regulatory scheme to govern employee benefit plans by providing standards for the establishment, operation and administration of these plans so as to ensure their financial soundness for employees. 29 U.S.C. 1001 (a). Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 prohibits the alienation or assignment of benefits because the statute was designed with the main purpose of protecting the interests of plan participants and their beneficiaries by minimizing the dissipation of pension funds. 29 U.S.C. 1001 (b); see also Boggs, 520 U.S. at 845. We are informed by the United States Supreme Court that "EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 does not confer beneficiary status on . . . former spouses by reason of their marital . . . status." Boggs, 520 U.S. at 847. Instead, " Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 confers beneficiary status on a nonparticipant spouse . . . in only narrow circumstances delineated by its provisions." Id. at 846. The protections afforded to spouses of plan participants are found in two Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 provisions: (1) the qualified joint and qualified pre-retirement survivor annuity (survivor annuity); (2) the qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) proviso, which is exempt from Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974's anti-alienation provision, 29 U.S.C. 1056 (d)(3)(A), and general pre-emption clause, 29 U.S.C. 1144 (b)(7). Boggs, 520 U.S. at 846. "The QDRO and the surviving spouse annuity provisions define the scope of a nonparticipant spouse's community property interest in pension plans consistent with Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974." Id. at 850.