In Hull v. Celanese Corporation (2d Cir. 1975) 513 F.2d 568, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion when it disqualified the plaintiff's counsel, the law firm of Rabinowitz, Boudin & Standard, to represent an in-house attorney, Joan Hull. ( Id. at pp. 571-572.) Ms. Hull sought to intervene in the plaintiff's suit. Ms. Hull sought to pursue her own title VII civil rights claims. Ms. Hull, the former in-house counsel for the defendant, had worked on the plaintiff's lawsuit. It bears emphasis that Ms. Hull, the in-house attorney, had provided legal representation to the defendant in the same lawsuit. Hull concluded disqualification of the Rabinowitz firm was appropriate based on the status of the new client as in-house counsel and under the appearance of impropriety standard. The court in Hull emphasized the narrow scope of its holding when it noted: "The novel factual situation presented here dictates a narrow reading of this opinion. This decision should not be read to imply that either Hull the former in-house counsel or Delulio the plaintiff cannot pursue her claim of employment discrimination based on sex. The scope of this opinion must, of necessity, be confined to the facts presented and not read as a broad-brush approach to disqualification." ( Id. at p. 572.) In Hull, an attorney working for a corporate defendant in an employment case retained the plaintiff's attorney to represent him in his claim against his employer. The court affirmed the disqualification of the plaintiff's attorney. The court said, "the court need not 'inquire whether the lawyer did, in fact, receive confidential information . . . .' Rather, 'where "it can reasonably be said that . . . the attorney might have acquired information related to the subject matter of his subsequent representation," , it is the court's duty to order the attorney disqualified.' The breach of confidence would not have to be proved; it is presumed in order to preserve the spirit of the Code of Professional Responsibility." ( Id. at p. 572.)