In Kristian v. Comcast Corp. (1st Cir. 2006) 446 F.3d 25, the court of appeals applied Green Tree Financial Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph (2000) 531 U.S. 79 to federal and state antitrust claims, specifically, the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12-27, 44) and the Massachusetts Antitrust Act (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, 1-14a). (See Kristian, at pp. 29, 43.) Although both acts authorized an award of attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party (15 U.S.C. 15(a); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, 12), the arbitration agreements precluded such an award. In concluding that the agreements' prohibition on an award of attorney fees and costs was unenforceable, the court of appeals stated: "The Supreme Court's assumption in Randolph that a showing of prohibitive arbitration costs is a valid challenge to enforcement of an arbitration agreement makes practical sense. If, because of a consumer agreement, ... a plaintiff's only apparent dispute resolution forum is binding, mandatory arbitration, and the plaintiff cannot afford to arbitrate because of an inability to recover attorney's fees and costs, the plaintiff is essentially deprived of any dispute resolution forum whatsoever. ... "Here, Plaintiffs have a much stronger position than the plaintiff in Randolph. The clause in Randolph was silent on the question of costs and fees. By contrast, the ... arbitration agreements explicitly state that a plaintiff bears all of his or her own costs, including the cost of experts and attorneys. The conflict between the arbitration agreements and the statutes could not be clearer. More importantly, again in contrast to the plaintiff in Randolph, Plaintiffs make a strong showing that costs and attorney's fees will be prohibitively expensive. In the district court, Plaintiffs submitted extensive declarations from a former Massachusetts Superior Court justice, an attorney who specializes in antitrust law and class actions, and an economist. These declarations establish that the pursuit of Plaintiffs' antitrust claims will require a huge outlay of financial resources. Without the possibility of recovering costs and attorney's fees, an individual plaintiff would undoubtedly have an impossible time securing legal representation ... ." (Kristian v. Comcast Corp., supra, 446 F.3d at pp. 51-52.) As stated by the court of appeals, "our conclusion on Plaintiff's vindication of statutory rights claim" (id. at p. 53) compels the affirmance of the district court's decision to sever the clause prohibiting the recovery of costs and attorney fees (ibid.).