LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) involved a former employee: he wanted to compete using confidential data from his former company. Brekka worked as an internet marketer with LVRC Holdings, LLC (LVRC), a residential addiction treatment center. Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1129. LVRC assigned him a computer and gave him access credentials to a third-party website that tracked traffic and other information for LVRCs website. Id. at 1129-30. When negotiations to become part owner of LVRC broke down, Brekka left the company. Id. at 1130. LVRC sued him, claiming that he violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) by emailing certain confidential company documents to his personal email account while an employee and also by continuing to access LVRCs account on the external website after he left the company. Id. In Brekka the Court analyzed both the without authorization and exceeds authorization provisions of the statute under 1030(a)(2) and (4). Id. at 1132-36. Because the CFAA does not define the term authorization, we looked to the ordinary, contemporaneous meaning of the term: permission or power granted by an authority. Id. at 1133 (quoting Random House Unabridged Dictionary 139 (2001)). In determining whether an employee has authorization, we stated that, consistent with the plain language of the statute . . . authorization to use an employers computer depends on actions taken by the employer. Id. at 1135. The Court concluded that because Brekka had permission to use his employers computer, the most straightforward interpretation of 1030(a)(2) and (4) is that Brekka had authorization to use the computer while an employee. Id. at 1133. Brekkas access after LVRC terminated his employment presented a starkly different situation: There is no dispute that if Brekka accessed LVRCs information on the traffic monitoring website after he left the company . . . , Brekka would have accessed a protected computer without authorization for purposes of the CFAA. Id. at 1136.4 Stated differently, we held that a person uses a computer without authorization under 1030(a)(2) and (4) . . . when the employer has rescinded permission to access the computer and the defendant uses the computer anyway. Id. at 1135. In Brekkas case, there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Brekka actually accessed the website, and thus we affirmed the district courts grant of summary judgment. Id. at 1137.