In Miller v. Pacific Shore Funding, Inc., 224 F.Supp.2d 977, 996 (D.Md. 2002), aff'd, 92 Fed. Appx. 933 (4th Cir. 2004), several mortgagors brought putative class actions in federal court, alleging violations by lending entities of the SMLL and the Consumer Protection Act, and seeking a declaratory judgment that their loan agreements were void or voidable as contracts that were contrary to Maryland public policy. The named plaintiffs in Miller named as defendants certain lending entities that had never actually held the loans of the named plaintiffs. The district court in Miller concluded that the named plaintiffs lacked standing to sue the non-holder defendants, explaining: Fundamentally, none of the plaintiffs alleges any contractual relationship whatsoever with Amaximis, Homeq, Banc One, or Bankers Trust. Indeed, they carefully avoid stating that any of these defendants holds their mortgage-secured notes or services their loans. Instead, in their allegations directed specifically at these defendants, the plaintiffs state only that they "are (or at one point during the life of the loans were) ... holders of mortgage notes related to mortgage loans made by Pacific to Plaintiffs and/or the Class." . They never identify them as assignees -- past or present -- or purchasers of their respective notes. Absent a contractual relationship with any of these defendants, the plaintiffs cannot possibly show that their injuries, such as they have suffered, are traceable to the conduct of any of these defendants; nor can they possibly show that a judicial ruling in their favor would likely redress their injuries. Therefore, plaintiffs lack standing to sue Amaximis, Homeq, Banc One, and Bankers Trust. Their categorization of this suit as a putative class action in no way cures this defect. (224 F.Supp. 2d at 995-96.) In Miller, supra, 224 F.Supp. 2d at 986, the district court concluded that all of the excessive closing costs and fees were "paid" via promissory note executed at the time of closing, and that, even if the total amount of the excessive closing costs was rolled into the loan balance and repaid over the life of the second mortgage, the borrowers could not recover any such fees in a suit filed more than three years after closing, regardless of whether they were still making installment payments under such notes. The court explained its reasoning for concluding that the statute of limitations barred a suit to recover the costs and fees that were charged at closing, id.: The plaintiff obtained the allegedly illegal secondary mortgage loan from Pacific on October 13, 1998. On that date, "at closing," ... he was charged all of the fees and expenses of which he complains. Therefore, that is the date on which "the legally operative facts permitting the filing of his claims came into existence." Heron v. Strader, 361 Md. 258 at 264, 761 A.2d 56 (2000). Furthermore, the charges were all expressly identified in the closing documents. At closing, therefore, the plaintiff also appears to have had sufficient knowledge of circumstances indicating he might have been harmed. See O'Hara v. Kovens, 305 Md. 280 at 302, 503 A.2d 1313 (1986). Despite this knowledge, he waited until January 16, 2002, more than three years after closing the loan, to file his suit. ... The court in Miller further explained, id. at 989-90: The fees that violated the SMLL were included in the total indebtedness on the loan. ... With each monthly bill, then, the plaintiff reasons, Pacific (or the current holder of the note) newly charges illegal fees; and with each monthly payment by the borrower, Pacific (or the current holder of the note) newly receives and collects illegal fees. The argument is ingenious, but flawed. The apparently punctuated charging, receipt, and collection are no more than the lingering, ongoing, continuing aspects of a unitary action initiated more than three years ago. If, as the plaintiff alleges, that action violates the SMLL, the violation has inflicted a single monetary injury whose amount increases steadily over time.