In Roberts v. McAfee, Inc. (9th Cir. 2011) 660 F.3d 1156, plaintiff Roberts allowed McAfee's vice president, Davis, to backdate some of his stock options. When McAfee subsequently was implicated in a probe of backdating of stock options, Roberts voluntarily disclosed to members of the board of directors that his options had been backdated. Roberts contended that during those conversations he disclosed the backdating, but acknowledged no problems with it; the directors said otherwise, contending that Roberts "had described 'agonizing' over the issue and admitted that what he had done was wrong." (Id. at p. 1160.) McAfee terminated Roberts and, after an investigation, presented to government agencies its conclusion that Roberts had engaged in illegal activity. (Ibid.) A federal criminal prosecution ensued, at the conclusion of which Roberts was acquitted of some charges; others were dropped. (Id. at pp. 1161-1162.) After his acquittal, Roberts sued McAfee for malicious prosecution, among other torts. (Roberts v. McAfee, Inc., supra, 660 F.3d at p. 1162.) The district court denied McAfee's anti-SLAPP motion to strike the malicious prosecution claim, citing "'disputed issues of fact regarding information provided by McAfee to the government investigators.'" (Ibid.) The Ninth Circuit reversed. It noted that although many facts were disputed, several key facts were not. Because those facts were sufficient to permit a reasonable person to suspect a crime had been committed, as a matter of law Roberts could not establish the absence of probable cause. The court explained: "Assuming, as we must at this stage, that Roberts' sworn allegations are correct, McAfee falsified and withheld evidence to make his culpability seem clearer than it really was. According to Roberts, McAfee or its agents said that he had confessed when he had not, and offered an incomplete picture of the backdating to exaggerate the degree of suspicion created by his conduct. If Roberts is right, McAfee behaved inexcusably. But, under California law, lying about the facts is not enough to destroy probable cause. In Sheldon Appel, the California Supreme Court held that, so long as the evidence known to the defendant could support an objectively reasonable suspicion--regardless of whether the defendant actually possessed such a suspicion--the defendant is not liable for malicious prosecution. Sheldon Appel, 765 P.2d at 506. By that same reasoning, a defendant who fabricates evidence still acts with probable cause if the defendant is aware of other evidence which would make it objectively reasonable to suspect the plaintiff's guilt. . "To be sure, McAfee would lack probable cause had it fabricated the entire predicate for its claim. . But that is because, in such a case, the defendant would know of no facts that could provide reason to suspect the plaintiff of wrongdoing. . "Here, by contrast, even if McAfee misrepresented certain aspects of the backdating to make Roberts look worse, it was also aware of other facts that, on their own, provided objectively reasonable suspicion that Roberts had committed a crime. . . . While Roberts was eventually successful in beating back the criminal and civil enforcement actions against him, the ultimate failure of a lawsuit does not mean there was no probable cause to bring it." (Roberts v. McAfee, Inc., supra, 660 F.3d at pp. 1164-1165.)