In Rutti v. LoJack Corporation, Inc. (2009) 578 F.3d 1084, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling on all but one of the claims--the claim for compensation for time spent on mandatory daily PDT transmissions. The court held the transmissions appeared to be integral to Rutti's principal activities, and there was a triable issue of fact whether or not the time spent on the transmissions was de minimis, and hence not compensable. (Id. at p. 1096.) The Ninth Circuit remanded the cause to the district court for resolution on this claim; in all other respects, the grant of partial summary judgment was affirmed. (Id. at p. 1099.) While the appeal was pending in the Ninth Circuit, Rutti and another LoJack employee, Gerson Anaya (collectively plaintiffs), filed this action in Los Angeles Superior Court on behalf of California LoJack technicians. They asserted state law claims for failure to provide meal and rest breaks and accurate wage statements; failure to indemnify for tools and vehicle maintenance; unpaid wages (including overtime wages); violation of the unfair competition law; and private attorney general penalties. Plaintiffs moved for class certification as to commute time, missed meal and lunch breaks, time spent on off-the-clock activities, daily overtime, and indemnification for purchase of work tools. On June 19, 2009, the trial court granted the motion for class certification on plaintiffs' claims for denied meal periods up to the time LoJack changed its policy of sending jobs during lunch time; denied rest breaks; failure to indemnify for purchased tools; failure to pay daily overtime; failure to pay for: on-call time, time washing and maintaining company vehicles, PDT transmission time, time charting route to first job site, travel time to UPS, and time to purchase business-related tools; and on causes of action for waiting time penalties, violation of the unfair competition law, and private attorney general penalties. The court denied certification as to claims for: denied meal periods after LoJack's change in policy; reimbursement for maintenance and repair of company vehicle; compensation for commute time and time traveling to company meetings; and compensation for time washing and maintaining uniforms. LoJack filed a petition for writ of mandate (Case No B218294), asserting the trial court granted class certification without any explanation. We issued an alternative writ, directing the trial court to vacate its order certifying certain claims and to issue a new order "containing the court's rationale in certifying those claims and in appointing real party Mike Rutti as class representative, in particular: explaining for each certified claim whether common, rather than individual, issues predominate; whether the claim was fairly raised in plaintiffs' motion for class certification and why real party in interest Rutti is an appropriate class representative in light of the federal district court's decision and Ninth Circuit's opinion in Rutti v. LoJack Corporation, Inc. . . ." or to show cause for not doing so. In response to the alternative writ, the trial court vacated its June 19 class certification order, and on September 24, 2009, issued an expanded order containing its rationale and discussing the adequacy of Rutti as class representative, the commonality of facts in the certified claims, and where the certified claims could be found in the complaint. LoJack filed this new petition for writ of mandate, challenging the substance of the court's order as to all claims except for daily overtime and indemnification for purchase of work tools. We issued an alternative writ and set the matter for oral argument on March 18, 2010. On March 2, 2010, the Ninth Circuit granted rehearing of the appeal from the district court, withdrew its August 21, 2009 opinion, and filed a superseding opinion (Rutti v. LoJack Corporation (9th Cir. 2010) F.3d 2010 WL 699946). The court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment on Rutti's claim for compensation for his commute under California law, and again vacated the grant of summary judgment with respect to daily PDT transmissions. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings.