Suh v. Yang

In Suh v. Yang (N.D.Cal. 1997) 987 F. Supp. 783, the plaintiff allegedly created a new form of martial arts and over many years had licensed some 120 schools nationwide to use his trademark and logo. The defendant first joined the plaintiff in his operations, and then left to form a competing school. The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant for his improper use of the terms "Kuk Sool Won" and "Kuk Sool" in which the plaintiff had claimed a protected proprietary interest. He alleged federal trademark and Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq.) violations, as well as causes of action under California common law and statutes, including the UCL. The parties each moved for summary judgment. Much of the opinion is devoted to a discussion of whether the name marks in question are legally protected, but the defendant also asserted that the state UCL claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The defendant concededly started using the marks in 1987, but the lawsuit was not filed until 1996 well beyond the four-year limitation of Business and Professions Code section 17208. The court nevertheless rejected the defendant's statute of limitations argument. It first assumed that neither delayed discovery nor equitable tolling applied to UCL actions, the same points which appellant here has conceded. (See Stutz Motor Car of America, Inc. v. Reebok Internat., Ltd. (C.D.Cal. 1995) 909 F. Supp. 1353, affd. 113 F.3d 1258, cert. den. (1997) 522 U.S. 863 139 L.Ed.2d 112, 118 S.Ct. 169.) The court then held: "Assuming, arguendo, that Stutz correctly interprets Section 17208, Plaintiff's claim for unfair competition would not be barred by the four year statute of limitations since the alleged wrongs (i.e., the wrongful use and dilution of Suh's service marks) are multiple, continuous acts, and some of these acts have occurred within the limitations period." (Suh, supra, 987 F.Supp. at p. 795.) The court found that Stutz was distinguishable because the claim there was based on a single wrong. The Suh court concluded that the plaintiff's claims involved repeated acts of wrongful appropriation, each creating "a separate cause of action for unfair competition and trademark infringement." (Id. at p. 796.)