In Takahashi v. Board of Trustees of Livingston Union School Dist. (9th Cir. 1986) 783 F.2d 848, Takahashi was terminated from her teaching position because a commission on professional competence found her incompetent to teach. She brought a mandamus action in superior court to compel the commission to reinstate her employment. The action was based on the invasion of her alleged contractual right to employment. (Id. at pp. 849, 850.) The trial court ruled against her, and the appellate court affirmed, finding she had no right to reinstatement based on the school district's failure to evaluate her performance under a provision of the Education Code, and substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that cause existed for her dismissal. (Takahashi, supra, at p. 849.) Takahashi then filed an action in federal court, alleging her termination of employment violated her civil rights under title 42 United States Code sections 1981 and 1983, because it was based on her sex and ethnic origin, the requirement that she maintain a suitable learning environment in her classroom was impermissibly vague, and she was subjected to methods of job performance evaluation to which other employees were not subjected. She sought compensatory damages for lost wages and mental distress, and punitive damages. (Takahashi, supra, 783 F.2d at p. 849.) The district court dismissed the suit on the ground of res judicata and she appealed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding the claim preclusion aspect of the res judicata doctrine barred the action since the state and federal suits were based on the same primary right, the right to employment. The court explained: "Absent termination of her employment contract, Takahashi suffered no harm. Takahashi's allegations of mental distress caused as a result of her dismissal do not present a separate injury. Rather, any such distress would be a consequence of the District's violation of Takahashi's primary contractual right. Consequential damages cannot support a separate cause of action." (Id. at p. 851, ) The court in Takahashi rejected Takahashi's characterization of the primary right invaded as the right not to be discriminated against on the ground of ethnic origin in the evaluation and dismissal process. The court noted Takahashi "has failed to allege a new injury. 'Even where there are multiple legal theories upon which recovery might be predicated, one injury gives rise to only one claim of relief.' By invoking the Constitution and title 42 United States Code section 1983, Takahashi has merely presented a new legal theory upon which she seeks recovery." (Takahashi, supra, 783 F.2d at p. 851)