In United States v. Alzate, 47 F.3d 1103 (11th Cir. 1995) the court, after articulating the standard of materiality applicable to Brady claims, stated: A different and more defense-friendly standard of materiality applies where the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony, or failed to correct what he subsequently learned was false testimony. Where either of those events has happened, the falsehood is deemed to be material "if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury." United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342, 96 S. Ct. 2392 (1976). As the Supreme Court has held, this standard of materiality is equivalent to the Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967), "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 679 n.9. Id. at 1110, quoted in Trepal, 846 So. 2d at 439 (Pariente, J., specially concurring).