In U.S. v. Sepulveda (1st Cir. 1993) 15 F.3d 1161, after defense counsel had raised the specter of jury nullification in closing argument, the deliberating jury asked the court to clarify the law on jury nullification. The court responded that it could not instruct on jury nullification. It also confirmed that the jury should convict the defendant if the government proved its case, and must acquit the defendant if the government failed to prove its case. (Sepulveda, supra, 15 F.3d at p. 1189.) Appellants in Sepulveda argued that the trial court wrongly repudiated the concept of jury nullification. The First Circuit stated: "The applicable rule is that, although jurors possess the raw power to set an accused free for any reason or for no reason, their duty is to apply the law as given to them by the court. Accordingly, while jurors may choose to flex their muscles, ignoring both law and evidence in a gadarene rush to acquit a criminal defendant, neither the court nor counsel should encourage jurors to exercise this power. A trial judge, therefore, . . . may instruct the jury on the dimensions of their duty to the exclusion of jury nullification . . . . Appellants say, Judge Devine should have assured them that nullification is an 'historical prerogative' of juries from time immemorial. We disagree. Though jury nullification has a long and sometimes storied past, . . . the case law makes plain that a judge may not instruct the jury anent its history, vitality, or use. . . . This proscription is invariant . . . . Thus, the district court appropriately scotched appellants' suggested jury instruction." (Sepulveda, supra, at p. 1190.) In addition, the First Circuit concluded that the trial court's comment was an "accurate recitation of the law and an appropriate rejoinder to the jury's question on nullification." (Ibid.)