In United States v. Manske, 186 F.3d 770 (7th Cir. 1999), the defense sought to cross-examine a government witness, Pszeniczka, about past acts of witness intimidation which the government acknowledged had taken place. These were "incidents where Pszeniczka, or people acting on his behalf, allegedly threatened potential witnesses in an effort to keep them from incriminating him." 186 F.3d at 773. The trial court barred the impeachment. On appeal, the government "essentially urged on" the court a "narrow reading" of Rule 608 (b) whereby a crime is viewed "as bearing on veracity only if it involves falsehood or deception, such as forgery or perjury." Id. at 775. The court of appeals rejected that reading. It quoted with approval a treatise on evidence which recommended that "when a party's question is specific and well-founded, the cross-examiner should be allowed to ask . . . questions on acts better described as dishonest than false . . . including questions related to concealing or frightening off witnesses or suborning perjury (even in unrelated cases)." Id. The court also pointed to its prior decisions extending the reach of the rule to acts of theft and receiving stolen property, and reasoned: "The relationship between the specific acts of misconduct and truthfulness is, if anything, more compelling in this case. Threatening to cause physical harm to a person who proposes to testify against you is at least as probative of truthfulness as receiving stolen tires or a stolen railroad ticket. Also, because Stephen Pszeniczka had no compunction about intimidating potential witnesses in previous legal proceedings, "it is hard to see" why he would hesitate to obtain an advantage for himself in the defendant Manske's trial by giving false testimony against Manske". Id. at 776.