In Alleyne v. United States (2013) 570 U.S. 133 S.Ct. 2151, the jury convicted the defendant of robbery affecting interstate commerce (18 U.S.C. 1951(a)) and using or carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)). Using or carrying a firearm subjects an offender to a term not less than five years, brandishing the firearm subjects an offender to a term not less than seven years, and discharging the firearm subjects an offender to a term not less than 10 years (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii)). More specifically, the jury's verdict indicated the defendant had used or carried a firearm during the commission of the offense. (Alleyne, supra, 133 S.Ct. at pp. 2155-2156.) The presentence report recommended a seven-year sentence, which reflected the mandatory minimum sentence relative to an offender who had brandished a firearm during commission of the offense. Alleyne objected to the recommended seven-year term, contending it would violate his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial as the jury did not find brandishing beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court, however, relied upon Harris v. United States (2002) 536 U.S. 545 in overruling Alleyne's objections, explaining that brandishing was a sentencing factor it could properly find by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, it imposed the seven-year term. The court of appeals affirmed. (Alleyne, supra, 133 S.Ct. at p. 2156.) In reversing, the Supreme Court stated: "In Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, we held that a fact is by definition an element of the offense and must be submitted to the jury if it increases the punishment above what is otherwise legally prescribed. While Harris declined to extend this principle to facts increasing mandatory minimum sentences, Apprendi's definition of 'elements' necessarily includes not only facts that increase the ceiling, but also those that increase the floor. Both kinds of facts alter the prescribed range of sentences to which a defendant is exposed and do so in a manner that aggravates the punishment. Facts that increase the mandatory minimum sentence are therefore elements and must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt." (Alleyne, supra, 133 S.Ct. at p. 2158.) The Alleyne court held that "defining facts that increase a mandatory statutory minimum to be part of the substantive offense enables the defendant to predict the legally applicable penalty from the face of the indictment." (Alleyne, supra, 133 S.Ct. at p. 2161.) The Court expanded on its previous decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 in the context of a statutory scheme that imposed enhancements to a sentence for a defendant who "uses or carries a firearm" in relation to a "crime of violence." (Alleyne, at pp. 2155-2156.) Under the statute, the defendant must be sentenced to a term of not less than five years for that conduct, but also provided for a term of not less than seven years if the firearm was brandished and a term of not less than 10 years if the firearm was discharged. (Ibid.) The jury found the defendant "'used or carried a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence' but did not indicate a finding that the firearm was 'brandished.'" (Id. at p. 2156.) However, the trial court sentenced the defendant to seven years, concluding brandishing was not an element the jury was required to determine beyond a reasonable doubt but was instead a sentencing factor the trial court could find by a preponderance of the evidence. (Ibid.) The Alleyne court reversed, declaring Apprendi established that a fact "is by definition an element of the offense and must be submitted to the jury if it increases the punishment above what is otherwise legally prescribed" for purposes of the maximum term a defendant is to be punished, and Alleyne concluded this same definition applied to facts that also increase the mandatory minimum sentence. (Alleyne, at p. 2158.)