In American Federation of Labor v. Labor Board, 308 U.S. 401 (1940), the Supreme Court held that a Board order in certification proceedings under 9 is not "a final order" and therefore is not subject to judicial review except as it may be drawn in question by a petition for enforcement or review of an order, made under 10 (c) of the Act, restraining an unfair labor practice. But the Court was at pains to point out in that case that "the question there presented was distinct from . . . whether petitioners are precluded by the provisions of the Wagner Act from maintaining an independent suit in a district court to set aside the Board's action because contrary to the statute . . . ." (Id., at 404.) The Board argued there, as it does here, that the provisions of the Act, particularly 9 (d), have foreclosed review of its action by an original suit in a District Court. The Supreme Court said: "But that question is not presented for decision by the record before us. Its answer involves a determination whether the Wagner Act, in so far as it has given legally enforceable rights, has deprived the district courts of some portion of their original jurisdiction conferred by 24 of the Judicial Code. It can be appropriately answered only upon a showing in such a suit that unlawful action of the Board has inflicted an injury on the petitioners for which the law, apart from the review provisions of the Wagner Act, affords a remedy. This question can be properly and adequately considered only when it is brought to us for review upon a suitable record." (Id., at 412.) In American Federation of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 60 S.Ct. 300, 84 L.Ed. 347 (1940), the Supreme Court first suggested, though it did not hold, that NLRB actions short of unfair labor practice orders might nevertheless be contested in court. In that case the Court declined to rule on the Board's claim that no judicial review whatever was available for non-ULP orders. The issue, the Court said, involves a determination whether the Wagner Act (NLRA), in so far as it has given legally enforceable rights, has deprived the district courts of some portion of their original jurisdiction conferred by 24 of the Judicial Code (the predecessor to 28 U.S.C. 1337). It can be appropriately answered only upon a showing in such a suit that unlawful action of the Board has inflicted an injury on the petitioners for which the law, apart from the review provisions of the Wagner Act, affords a remedy. 308 U.S. at 412, 60 S.Ct. at 305-306. The Court applied this approach in Inland Empire Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697, 65 S.Ct. 1316, 89 L.Ed. 1877 (1945). After losing a representation election to another union, the Inland Empire Council challenged the Board's pre-election procedures and protested the exclusion of certain employees from voting. The Board rejected the complaint, and the union sued in District Court. The Supreme Court found that the losing union had failed to show that the Board had "depart(ed) from statutory requirements or from those of due process of law," id. at 700, 65 S.Ct. at 1318, so the courts lacked jurisdiction of the claim.