Anderson v. Charles
In Anderson v. Charles (1980) 447 U.S. 404, the Supreme Court declined to extend Doyle v. Ohio (1976) to a situation in which the defendant did not invoke his Miranda rights, but waived them and gave a postarrest statement inconsistent with his trial testimony.
The court held, "Doyle does not apply to cross-examination that merely inquires into prior inconsistent statements.
Such questioning makes no unfair use of silence, because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain silent." (Anderson, at p. 408.)
Further, in People v. Hurd (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1093, the court held:
"A defendant has no right to remain silent selectively. Once a defendant elects to speak after receiving a Miranda warning, his or her refusal to answer questions may be used for impeachment purposes absent any indication that such refusal is an invocation of Miranda rights." The Supreme Court clarified that Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610 does not apply when the defendant waives Miranda rights and makes a statement but then gives a different version at trial. In Anderson, the defendant was arrested, waived his rights and stated that he had stolen a car from a particular location. (Id. at p. 405.) At trial, the defendant testified that he obtained the car from another location.
The prosecutor asked, "'Don't you think it's rather odd that if the defendant's trial testimony were the truth that you didn't come forward and tell anybody at the time you were arrested, where you got that car?'" (Id. at p. 406.) Finding that there was no Doyle error, the Supreme Court reasoned that the prosecutor's questioning constituted impeachment with a prior inconsistent statement rather than impeachment with silence. "The prosecutor's questions were not designed to draw meaning from silence, but to elicit an explanation for a prior inconsistent statement.We conclude that Doyle does not apply to the facts of this case." (Id. at p. 409.)
"We do not believe that the cross-examination in this case can be bifurcated so neatly. The quoted colloquy, taken as a whole, does 'not refer to the defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent; rather it asks the defendant why, if his trial testimony were true, he didn't tell the officer that he stole the decedent's car from the tire store parking lot instead of telling him that he took it from the street.' ... The questions were not designed to draw meaning from silence, but to elicit an explanation for a prior inconsistent statement." (Anderson v. Charles, supra, 477 U.S. at pp. 408-409.)