In Anderson v. Dunn (1821) 19 U.S. 204, the House of Representatives of the United States Congress had appointed a committee to make certain investigations; this committee reported back to the House which acted directly in holding the witness in contempt, not of the committee, but of the House of Representatives, and the warrant of commitment under the resolution was signed by Henry Clay who was then speaker of the House of Representatives. The Court reiterated its view that the contempt power was an inherent component of the judicial power. That case presented an issue more closely related to the questions of the source and scope of the federal courts' contempt power, although still not directly on point: whether the House of Representatives could direct its Sergeant at Arms to seek out a person who had disrupted its proceedings, bring him before the House to be tried for contempt, and hold him in custody until completion of the proceedings. The Court noted that "there is no power given by the constitution to either House to punish for contempts, except when committed by their own members," (id., at 225), and that "if this power . . . is to be asserted on the plea of necessity, the ground is too broad, and the result too indefinite; . . . the executive, and every co-ordinate, and even subordinate, branch of government, may resort to the same justification, and the whole assume to themselves, in the exercise of this power, the most tyrannical licentiousness." (Id., at 228.) Nevertheless, the Court upheld the House's action, concluding that any other course "leads to the total annihilation of the power of the House of Representatives to guard itself from contempts, and leaves it exposed to every indignity and interruption that rudeness, caprice, or even conspiracy, may meditate against it." (Ibid.) It was said that `courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates.' The Court held that from the power to legislate there was to be implied the right of Congress to preserve itself, i.e., to deal by way of contempt with direct obstructions to its legislative duties. The Supreme Court, was almost prophetic in describing what could happen if a legislative body did not have the power of contempt to protect itself. It said, (page 227), "The unreasonable murmurs of individuals against the restraints of society, have a direct tendency to produce that worst of all despotisms, which makes every individual the tyrant over his neighbor's rights." And the United States Supreme Court goes on to state, "the total annihilation of the power of the House of Representatives to guard itself from contempts . . . leaves it exposed to every indignity and interruption that rudeness, caprice, or even conspiracy, may meditate against it." In considering the extent of the contempt power which a legislative body may assume upon the principle of self-preservation, the court stated its much quoted test, (page 230), "Analogy, and the nature of the case, furnish the answer - ` the least possible power adequate to the end proposed;' which is the power of imprisonment." Since the contempt power was only to be used to protect the legislature in its deliberation, the duration of the confinement was to be limited to what was necessary and the court held, "that imprisonment must terminate with that adjournment." Justice Johnson also said: "But if there is one maxim which necessarily rides over all others, in the practical application of government, it is, that the public functionaries must be left at liberty to exercise the powers which the people have intrusted to them. The interests and dignity of those who created them, require the execution of the powers indispensable to the attainment of the ends of their creation. Nor is a casual conflict with the rights of particular individuals any reason to be urged against the exercise of such powers. The wretch beneath the gallows may repine at the fate which awaits him, and yet it is no less certain, that the laws under which he suffers were made for his security. The unreasonable murmurs of individuals against the restraints of society have a direct tendency to produce that worst of all despotisms, which makes every individual the tyrant over his neighbor's rights. That `the safety of the people is the supreme law,' not only comports with, but is indispensable to, the exercise of those powers in their public functionaries without which that safety cannot be guarded."