In Bradley v. Fisher (1871) 80 U.S. 335, the United States Supreme Court described the distinction between an act in excess of jurisdiction and an act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction: "Where there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject matter, any authority exercised is a usurped authority, and no immunity exists." Id. The Bradley court gave the following examples: If a probate judge, with jurisdiction over only wills and estates, tried a criminal case, he would be acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction-this being necessarily known to the judge-and he would not be immune from liability for his actions. (Id.) On the other hand, if a judge of a criminal court convicted a defendant of a nonexistent crime, or with a sentence not permitted by law, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction, not in the complete absence of all jurisdiction, and he would therefore be immune because he still had general jurisdiction over the subject matter. (Id. at 351-52.) The Supreme Court stated that the applicability of judicial immunity to a judge is not "affected by the motives with which their judicial acts are performed. The purity of their motives cannot in this way be the subject of judicial inquiry." The Supreme Court said, "the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." Justice Field speaking for the Court said: "Nor can this exemption of the judges from civil liability be affected by the motives with which their judicial acts are performed. The purity of their motives cannot in this way be the subject of judicial inquiry. This was adjudged in the case of Floyd and Barker, reported by Coke, in 1608, where it was laid down that the judges of the realm could not be drawn in question for any supposed corruption impeaching the verity of their records, except before the king himself, and it was observed that if they were required to answer otherwise, it would `tend to the scandal and subversion of all justice, and those who are the most sincere, would not be free from continual calumniations.'" Mr. Justice Field also said (at p. 652): "Admission as an attorney is not obtained without years of labor and study. The office which the party thus acquires is one of value, and often becomes the source of great honor and emolument to its possessor. To most persons who enter the profession it is the means of support to themselves and their families. To deprive one of an office of this character would often be to decree poverty to himself and destitution to his family." The Supreme Court of the United States held that judicial immunity could be lost only for acts over which the judge had no jurisdiction whatever: ". . . Judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly. A distinction must be here observed between excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter. Where there is clearly no jurisdiction over . . . the subject-matter, any authority exercised is a usurped authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible. But where jurisdiction over the subject-matter is invested by law in the judge, or in the court which he holds, the manner and extent in which the jurisdiction shall be exercised are generally as much questions for his determination as any other questions involved in the case, although upon the correctness of his determination in these particulars the validity of his judgments may depend." In sum, the Supreme Court illustrated the distinction between lack of jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction with the following examples: if a probate judge, with jurisdiction over only wills and estates, should try a criminal case, he would be acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction and would not be immune from liability for his action; on the other hand, if a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction and would be immune. Id., at 352.