In Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269 (1998), the trial judge gave an instruction on a statutory aggravating factor and declined to give the capital defendant's proposed instructions on statutory and general nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. The jury recommended a sentence of death. The United States Supreme Court distinguished between the "eligibility" phase and the "selection" phase of a capital sentencing proceeding. "In the eligibility phase, the jury narrows the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty, often through consideration of aggravating circumstances." Id. at 275. The jury's discretion at this stage must be limited "to ensure that the death penalty is a proportionate punishment and therefore not arbitrary or capricious in its imposition." Id. at 275-76. In the next phase, where mitigating circumstances have relevance, the jury decides whether the eligible defendant should receive a death sentence. In this "selection" phase, "the sentencer may not be precluded from considering, and may not refuse to consider, any constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence." Id. at 276. But the Court, noting that its previous "decisions suggest that complete jury discretion is constitutionally permissible" during the selection phase, held that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury "on the concept of mitigation and . . . on particular statutorily defined mitigating factors did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution." Id. at 276, 279. Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 118 S.Ct. 757, 139 L.Ed.2d 702 (1998) declared that "in the selection phase, Supreme Court cases have established that the sentencer may not be precluded from considering, and may not refuse to consider, any constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence." Id. at 276, 118 S.Ct. 757. It also reaffirmed that states do not have an unhindered ability to create sentencing schemes as they see fit, and that to be constitutional they must not "preclude the jury from giving effect to any relevant mitigating evidence." Id. The court also made clear that the appropriate standard for assessing the constitutionality of a jury instruction scheme is "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence." Id. In Buchanan, although the Court held that a state is not required to affirmatively instruct juries in a particular way on the manner in which mitigation evidence is to be considered, the Court also made clear that while the state may shape and structure the jury's consideration of mitigation, it may not "preclude the jury from giving effect to any relevant mitigating evidence." 522 U.S. at 276, 118 S.Ct. 757. "Our consistent concern has been that restrictions on the jury's sentencing determination not preclude the jury from being able to give effect to mitigating evidence." Id.