In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 141 L. Ed. 2d 633 (1998), the Court addressed a case in which an employee's indirect supervisor's conduct implied or threatened adverse employment action, but no such action was ever actually taken. The Court reiterated the standards explicated in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) and noted employers are typically only vicariously liable for quid pro quo harassment. Id. 118 S. Ct. at 2264-65. Although the Court categorized the conduct before it as falling under the "hostile environment" category, for which an employer's liability is typically based upon its own negligence, the Court went on to analyze whether the employer could still be liable under the law of agency. Id. 118 S. Ct. at 2265. In doing so, the Court found that sexual harassment is not within the course of the supervisor's employment. It then went on to consider the effect of section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency addressing liability for torts committed outside the scope of employment. That section provides in part: (2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their employment unless: (D) the servant . . . was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation. The Court concluded that, to hold an employer liable in such instances, a "tangible employment action" would be required. Id. 118 S. Ct. at 2268. That type of action must be by someone in a supervisory capacity because ordinarily a co-worker is not in a position to dock another's pay, deny them a promotion, or demote them. A "tangible employment action" is an act of the employer. Id. 118 S. Ct. at 2269.