In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006), the Court settled a circuit court split regarding the scope of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, specifically, the reach of its phrase "discriminate against": "Does that provision confine actionable retaliation to activity that affects the terms and conditions of employment? And how harmful must the adverse actions be to fall within its scope?" Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 57, 126 S.Ct. 2405. The Court answered these questions as follows: We conclude that the anti-retaliation provision does not confine the actions and harms it forbids to those that are related to employment or occur at the workplace. We also conclude that the provision covers those (and only those) employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant. In the present context that means that the employer's actions must be harmful to the point that they could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Id. In Burlington Northern, the petitioner-employer suspended an employee without pay for insubordination, but later rescinded the suspension and awarded her back pay. The employee alleged that the employer's actions were in retaliation for her complaints about gender discrimination in the workplace. Noting that Title VII's substantive provision, 703(a), protects an individual only from employment-related discrimination, the employer argued that 704(a) should be read in para materia with 703(a) to similarly require a link between the challenged retaliatory action and the terms, conditions, or status of employment. Id. at 61, 126 S.Ct. 2405. In rejecting the employer's contention, the Court scrutinized carefully the statutory language of the two provisions and found that they differed in significant respects. Id. Unlike 703(a), the anti-retaliation provision does not contain words limiting its scope to actions that affect employment or alter the conditions of the workplace. Id. at 62., 126 S.Ct. 2405. Applying statutory construction principles, the Court presumed that "where words differ as they differ here, `Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion,'" id. at 63, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983)), and therefore concluded that the substantive and anti-retaliation provisions are not coterminous: The two provisions differ not only in language but in purpose as well. The anti-discrimination provision seeks a workplace where individuals are not discriminated against because of their racial, ethnic, religious, or gender-based status. The anti-retaliation provision seeks to secure that primary objective by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee's efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act's basic guarantees. The substantive provision seeks to prevent injury to individuals based on who they are, i.e., their status. The anti-retaliation provision seeks to prevent harm to individuals based on what they do, i.e., their conduct. One cannot secure the second objective by focusing only upon employer actions and harm that concern employment and the workplace. Were all such actions and harms eliminated, the anti-retaliation provision's objective would not be achieved. An employer can effectively retaliate against an employee by taking actions not directly related to his employment or by causing him harm outside the workplace. A provision limited to employment-related actions would not deter the many forms that effective retaliation can take. Hence, such a limited construction would fail to fully achieve the anti-retaliation provision's "primary purpose," namely, "maintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms." Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997). Id. at 63-64, 126 S.Ct. 2405. The Court concluded that "purpose reinforces what language already indicates, namely, that the anti-retaliation provision, unlike the substantive provision, is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment." Id. at 64, 126 S.Ct. 2405. In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, U.S. 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006), the Court expressly held that retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 could be based on a hostile work environment and need not be based solely on discrete adverse employment actions that affect the terms or conditions of employment. Id. at 2414. The Court proceeded to establish a standard to define the concept of a hostile work environment for the purpose of retaliation claims under Title VII. The Court held that actions are considered materially adverse and are actionable in Title VII retaliation claims if the actions "well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination." Id. at 2415. In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 , 67 (2006), the Supreme Court noted that Title VIIs antiretaliation provision protects an individual not from all retaliation, but from retaliation that produces an injury or harm. The Supreme Court further noted that material adversity is distinct from trivial harms. Id. at 68. A materially adverse action is one that well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Id.