In Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 93 S.Ct. 1241, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973), the Court was reviewing the Comptroller's denial of an application to establish a new bank. The Comptroller had found, as a factual conclusion, that a new bank would be "an uneconomic venture in light of the banking needs and the banking services already available in the surrounding community." Camp v. Pitts, supra, 411 U.S. at 143, 93 S.Ct. at 1244. The Supreme Court held that the appropriate standard of review was whether that discretionary determination was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law ." Camp v. Pitts, supra, 411 U.S. at 142, 93 S.Ct. at 1244. The Supreme Court held that it was improper for a reviewing court to conduct a trial de novo to determine whether an agencys decision was capricious or an abuse of discretion. In such a case, where there is a failure to explain administrative action as to frustrate effective judicial review, the proper remedy is not to conduct a de novo hearing, but to obtain from the agency, either through affidavits or testimony, such additional explanation of the reasons for the agency decision as may prove necessary. Camp, 411 U.S. at 142-43. In Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 141, 93 S.Ct. 1241, 1244, 36 L.Ed.2d 106, 111 (1973), the Comptroller of the Currency, proceeding under a statute which did not require a formal hearing, refused to issue a certificate authorizing the organization of a new bank. That action came under review in a district court which, on examination of the record before the Comptroller, held that de novo review was not warranted and, viewing only the administrative record, sustained the Comptroller's ruling. On intermediate appeal, however, it was felt that the basis of the Comptroller's decision was too obscure to enable adequate review and a remand was ordered "for a trial de novo before the District Court," at which evidence pro and con would be introduced, and after which the court would determine "by a preponderance of evidence (whether) the Comptroller's ruling is capricious or an abuse of discretion." This, the Supreme Court held, was error. "The appropriate standard of review," the Court declared, "was . . . whether the Comptroller's adjudication was 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,' " and "(i)n applying that standard, the focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court."