In Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 115 S.Ct. 2440, 2446 (1995), the Board had rejected the display of the Ku Klux Klan's cross on its public square precisely because its content was religious; its proffered reason for denying the Klan's request was that the State had an interest in avoiding official endorsement of Christianity under the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court agreed that "compliance with the Establishment Clause is a state interest sufficiently compelling to justify content-based restrictions on speech." Capitol Square, U.S. at 115 S.Ct. 2446 (citing Lamb's Chapel and Widmar ). Nevertheless, following Lamb's Chapel and Widmar, it rejected the Establishment Clause defense. "The state did not sponsor the respondent's expression, the expression was made on government property that had been opened to the public for speech, and permission was requested through the same application process and on the same terms required of other private groups." U.S. 115 S.Ct. at 2453. In Capitol Square, a plurality of four of the Justices would have rejected the argument that private religious expression at the seat of government can be characterized as constituting a governmental endorsement of religion when the government has opened the forum to private speakers on equal terms. Three other Justices did not believe that such a definitive exception was necessary, but believed that, given the totality of circumstances in the case, no reasonable person could consider the display in question as an endorsement of a religious point of view by the state. Among the factors which ought to be considered, they pointed out, was an awareness that the forum is open to all as a place in which expressive conduct may take place. As Justice O'Connor wrote, "the endorsement test depends on a sensitivity to the unique circumstances and context of a particular challenged practice." U.S. 115 S.Ct. at 2456 (O'Connor, J., concurring). A plurality of the Court rejected the government's argument that a cross erected by a private group and placed in close "proximity to the seat of government" would violate the Establishment Clause because it "may produce the perception that the cross bears the government's approval." The plurality stated that government endorses religious expression in violation of the Establishment Clause only when the government speaks for itself or manages a forum in favor of private religious expression. See id. at 764, 115 S.Ct.2440. The plurality observed that "it is no violation of the Establishment Clause for government to enact neutral policies that happen to benefit religion." Id. While the concurring Justices gave a greater role to the conclusions of a reasonable observer in determining whether the government had endorsed the expression of a private speaker than the plurality, see id. at 777, 115 S.Ct.2440 (O'Connor, J., concurring) and 784-86 (Souter, J., concurring), they also rejected the government's Establishment Clause argument observing that the city could require that a sign be placed on or near the cross explaining that the city did not endorse the expression of the private speaker, id. at 776, 115 S.Ct.2440 (O'Connor, J., concurring) and 784, 115 S.Ct.2440 (Souter, J., concurring).