Carson v. American Brands Inc

In Carson v. American Brands Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84, 101 S.Ct. 993, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), the Supreme Court considered whether 28 U.S.C. section 1292(a)(1) permitted appeal from an order denying the parties' joint motion for approval of a consent decree that contained an injunction as one of its provisions. Id. at 80, 101 S.Ct. at 994-95. Because the order did not, on its face, deny an injunction, an appeal from the order did not fall precisely within the language of section 1292(a)(1). The Court nevertheless permitted the appeal. The Court stated that, while section 1292(a)(1) must be narrowly construed in order to avoid piecemeal litigation, it does permit appeals from orders that have the "practical effect" of denying an injunction, provided that the would-be appellant shows that the order "might have a serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence." Id. at 84, 101 S.Ct. at 997. In Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 101 S.Ct. 993, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), the Supreme Court considered whether 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1) jurisdiction existed to review a district court order denying the entry of a stipulated consent decree. Reasoning that "the proposed decree would have permanently enjoined respondents from discriminating against black employees," id. at 84, 101 S.Ct. 993, and required other prospective relief, the Court concluded that although the "decree did not in terms `refuse an injunction,' it nonetheless had the practical effect of doing so," id. at 83, 101 S.Ct. 993. It made clear, however, that "for an interlocutory order to be immediately appealable under 1292(a)(1), ... a litigant must show ... (1) that the interlocutory order of the district court might have a `serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence,' and (2) that the order can be `effectually challenged' only by immediate appeal...." Id. at 84, 101 S.Ct. 993 (quoting Baltimore Contractors v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181, 75 S.Ct. 249, 99 L.Ed. 233 (1955)). The Supreme Court stated: "For an interlocutory order to be immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(a)(1), however, a litigant must show more than that the order has the practical effect of refusing an injunction. Because Sec. 1292(a)(1) was intended to carve out only a limited exception to the final-judgment rule, we have construed the statute narrowly to ensure that appeal as of right under Sec. 1292(a)(1) will be available only in circumstances where an appeal will further the statutory purpose of "permitting litigants to effectually challenge interlocutory orders of serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence." Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181, 75 S.Ct. 249, 252, 99 L.Ed.2d 233 (1955) . Unless a litigant can show that an interlocutory order of the district court might have a "serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence," and that the order can be "effectually challenged" only by immediate appeal, the general congressional policy against piecemeal review will preclude interlocutory appeal." Id. at 84, 101 S.Ct. at 996-97.