In Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983), the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the "special factors" that bear upon the propriety of a Bivens action brought by military personnel against their superior officers. The Court concluded that those "special factors" also formed the basis of the Court's decision in Feres. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 298, 103 S.Ct. at 2364, 76 L.Ed.2d at 589-90. The servicemen in Chappell were members of the United States Navy. Their duty station was a combat naval vessel. The servicemen alleged that because of their minority race, their superior officers failed to assign them desirable duties, threatened them, gave them low performance evaluations, and imposed upon them penalties of unusual severity. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 297, 103 S.Ct. at 2364, 76 L.Ed.2d at 589. The Court concluded that the "special factors" of "the unique disciplinary structure of the military establishment and Congress's activity in the field" dictated against providing the servicemen a Bivens remedy against their superior officer. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304, 103 S.Ct. at 2367, 76 L.Ed.2d at 593. The military establishment is founded upon a unique "hierarchical structure of discipline and obedience to command." Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300, 103 S.Ct. at 2365, 76 L.Ed.2d at 591. The servicemen in Chappell were on active duty and subject to direct orders. The Supreme Court concluded that if those servicemen were permitted to expose their superior officers to personal liability, "the special nature of military life, the need for unhesitating and decisive action by military officers and equally disciplined responses by enlisted personnel, would be undermined." Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304, 103 S.Ct. at 2367, 76 L.Ed.2d at 593. The Supreme Court's decision to bar the servicemen's claim was also influenced by the fact that the statutory scheme and the comprehensive internal justice system which Congress has devised to regulate military life, adequately provided for the review and remedy of the servicemen's racial discrimination complaints. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 302, 103 S.Ct. at 2366, 76 L.Ed.2d at 592. The Court cautioned that it was not establishing a per se rule that military personnel could never seek redress in civilian courts for constitutional violations suffered in the course of military service: This Court has never held, nor do we now hold, that military personnel are barred from all redress in civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered in the course of military service. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304, 103 S.Ct. at 2367, 76 L.Ed.2d at 593. Civilian courts must merely hesitate long before entertaining a suit which asks the court to tamper with the established relationship between enlisted military personnel and their superior officers because that relationship is at the heart of the necessarily unique structure of the military establishment. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300, 103 S.Ct. at 2365, 76 L.Ed.2d at 591. In Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983), the Court refused to recognize a Bivens -type remedy for enlisted men suing their superior officers for alleged violations of the men's constitutional rights The Chappell Court analyzed the men's nonstatutory constitutional claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). The Court noted that "before a Bivens remedy may be fashioned ... a court must take into account any 'special factors counselling hesitation.' " Chappell, 103 S.Ct. at 2364. The Court then found that "taken together, the unique disciplinary structure of the military establishment and Congress' activity in the field constitute 'special factors' which dictate that it would be inappropriate to provide enlisted military personnel a Bivens -type remedy against their superior officers." Id. at 2367. The Court repeatedly emphasized the first special factor: the necessity for judicial restraint in hearing claims involving military discipline and the relationship between military personnel and their superior officers. It noted: The need for special regulations in relation to military discipline, and the consequent need and justification for a special and exclusive system of military justice, is too obvious to require extensive discussion.... We must be "concerned with the disruption of 'the peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors' that might result if the soldier were allowed to hale his superiors into court." Id. at 2365-67.