In Chiarella v. U.S. (1980) 445 U.S. 222, the petitioner was indicted on and convicted of 17 counts of violating section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission rule 10b-5 even though he was not a corporate insider and had not received confidential information from a company targeted for takeover. (Id. at pp. 225, 231.) While working for a financial printer, petitioner had handled announcements of corporate takeover bids and deduced the names of the undisclosed target companies. (Id. at p. 224.) He "purchased stock in the target companies and sold the shares immediately after the takeover attempts were made public." (Ibid.) At trial, liability was predicated upon petitioner's failure to disclose material, nonpublic information before his stock purchases. (Id. at p. 236.) The trial court instructed: "Under some specific circumstances if the evidence establishes aiding and abetting of one crime, a person may also be found guilty of other crimes that occurred during the commission of the first crime." It made clear that a person may be guilty of a crime either as a direct perpetrator or as an aider and abettor. The court also instructed on the natural and probable consequence doctrine and told the jury "the defendant is guilty of kidnap for robbery and/or kidnap if the People have proved that the defendant aided and abetted either robbery or robbery in concert and that kidnap for robbery or kidnap was the natural and probable consequence of either the robbery or robbery in concert." The United States Supreme Court held that "a duty to disclose under 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information" (id. at p. 235) and reversed. (Id. at p. 237.) The court declined to consider the government's new misappropriation theory raised for the first time on appeal because the jury had not been instructed on it and noted that, even if the jury had been instructed on both theories, the court would not have upheld the conviction because it would have been impossible to determine if petitioner had been punished for noncriminal conduct based on an improper legal theory. (Id. at pp. 236, 237, fn. 21.)