In Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 317, 84 L.Ed. 329 (1940), the bank brought suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas to collect on some bonds of the Chicot County District, the bank's rights in which had been adjudicated by the same district court sitting in bankruptcy. In this suit the district court held that its former order in the bankruptcy proceedings were void because it was based on a statute subsequently declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the bank had not attacked the validity of the statute in the bankruptcy proceedings. At page 375 of 308 U.S., at page 319 of 60 S.Ct., 84 L.Ed. 329 it said: " As parties, these bondholders had full opportunity to present any objections to the proceeding, not only as to its regularity, or the fairness of the proposed plan of readjustment, or the propriety of the terms of the decree, but also as to the validity of the statute under which the proceeding was brought and the plan put into effect. Apparently no question of validity was raised and the cause proceeded to decree on the assumption by all parties and the court itself that the statute was valid. There was no attempt to review the decree. If the general principles governing the defense of res judicata are applicable, these bondholders, having the opportunity to raise the question of invalidity, were not the less bound by the decree because they failed to raise it. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 24 L.Ed. 195; Case v. Beauregard, 101 U.S. 688, 692 25 L.Ed. 1004; Baltimore Steamship Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 319, 325 47 S.Ct. 600, 71 L. Ed. 1069; Grubb v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 281 U.S. 470, 479 50 S.Ct. 374, 74 L.Ed. 972." In Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 317, 84 L.Ed. 329 (1940), the Supreme Court applied res judicata to preclude a claim. In Chicot County the Court held that a judgment effecting a plan of readjustment of indebtedness, resulting in a cancellation of certain bonds, precluded a subsequent suit on the same bonds. The subsequent suit on the bonds alleged the unconstitutionality of the 1934 Readjustment Act which was the basis of the prior action. Although the question of constitutionality in Chicot County, like the antitrust issue here, was not actually litigated in the earlier action, and although the suit to recover on the bonds was a different cause of action, the Supreme Court applied the principle of res judicata to bar the second action. The Court explained: As parties, these bondholders had full opportunity to present any objections to the proceeding . . . . Apparently no question of validity was raised and the cause proceeded to decree on the assumption by all parties and the court itself that the statute was valid. . . . If the general principles governing the defense of Res judicata are applicable, these bondholders, having the opportunity to raise the question of invalidity, were not the less bound by the decree because they failed to raise it. 308 U.S. at 375, 60 S.Ct. at 319. In Chicot Cty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 317, 84 L.Ed. 329 (1940), the Court wrote: "The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration." Id. at 374, 60 S.Ct. at 318. In Chicot County Drainage Comm'n v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 317, 84 L.Ed. 329 (1940), the Supreme Court gave preclusive effect to a prior judgment, notwithstanding the fact that the prior court's jurisdiction had been based upon a statute later found to be unconstitutional. The case dealt with a bondholder's suit to recover the value of his defaulted bonds, even though in a prior bankruptcy proceeding a court had effected a reorganization plan (to which the party had notice) which disposed of the issuer's obligations; the constitutionality of the bankruptcy act, and therefore the court's jurisdiction, were not questioned in the first proceeding.