Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) outlines the "proper extent" of "the 'search incident to arrest' principle." (Id. at p. 762.) First, to effect the arrest in a safe manner, "it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape." (Id. at p. 763.) Second, the police may conduct a "search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction." (Ibid.) For the foregoing purposes only, "the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items"--i.e., "the area 'within his immediate control' "--is "governed by a like rule." (Ibid.) Chimel v. California was decided in 1969, officers went to the defendant's home with a warrant for his arrest. The defendant's wife let the officers inside, where they waited for the defendant to return home from work. When the defendant entered his home, an officer handed him the arrest warrant and asked for permission to " 'look around.' " (Chimel, supra, 395 U.S. at p. 753.) The defendant objected, but the officers nevertheless conducted a search through the entire house, garage, and workshop. After completing the search, which took between 45 minutes and an hour, the officers seized numerous items. (Id. at pp. 753-754.) The defendant contended during his trial and on appeal that the items taken from his house were admitted into evidence against him over his objection, and that they had been unconstitutionally seized. (Id. at p. 754.) The question before the United States Supreme Court was whether the warrantless search of the defendant's entire house could be constitutionally justified as incident to the defendant's arrest. (Id. at p. 755.) The court determined that the scope of the search was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (395 U.S. at p. 768.) "When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control'--construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." (Chimel, supra, 395 U.S. at pp. 762-763.) "The search here went far beyond the defendant's person and the area from within which he might have obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as evidence against him. There was no constitutional justification, in the absence of a search warrant, for extending the search beyond that area." (Id. at p. 768.) "A reviewing court, charged with the task of evaluating a Chimel search, must first put itself in the position of the law enforcement officers who initiated it. ... Only after we have engaged in the same ex ante calculations that the police themselves faced should we consider whether subsequent events made a Chimel search unreasonable. At this second level of inquiry it does not make sense to prescribe a constitutional test that is entirely at odds with safe and sensible police procedures. Thus handcuffing one defendant and having reinforcements enter the house should not be determinative, unless we intend to use the Fourth Amendment to impose on police a requirement that the search be absolutely contemporaneous with the arrest, no matter what the peril to themselves or to bystanders. It is surely possible for a Chimel search to be undertaken too long after the arrest and too far from the arrestee's person. That is the lesson of Chadwick. But we do not consider that the presence of more officers than suspects invalidated the immediate search of the second defendant's bag. Nor do we think that a five-minute delay between seizing the first defendant's bag and opening it, occasioned by the officer's handcuffing that defendant and moving him to the street, defeased the officer's right to search under Chimel principles." (United States v. Fleming (7th Cir. 1982) 677 F.2d 602 at pp. 607-608.) In United States v. Fleming (7th Cir. 1982) 677 F.2d 602 , one defendant was arrested as he was approaching the front door of the second defendant's home. The first defendant had a bag in his hand at the time of his arrest, but dropped it. An officer picked it up, but did not open it until five minutes later, after the defendant had been taken to the street and handcuffed. The bag contained $ 10,000. The second defendant also had a bag in his hand at the time of his arrest. It, too, fell to the floor. One of the officers who went inside the home to make the arrest picked up the bag, immediately opened it in that defendant's presence, and saw cocaine. (Id. at pp. 605-606.) The defendants contended on appeal that, "because the danger addressed by a Chimel search had dissipated, so had any justification for opening the bags without a search warrant." (Id. at p. 606.) The appellate court disagreed. "Precedent of the Supreme Court and this Circuit suggests that the right to conduct a Chimel search is not so evanescent." (Ibid.)