In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997), the Court considered the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Recovery Act ("RFRA"), specifically whether Congress, in enacting RFRA, properly had exercised its enforcement power under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court first "acknowledged that 5 is a `positive grant of legislative power to Congress.'" Id. at 517, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966)). "Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into `legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the states.'" Id. at 518, 117 S.Ct. 2157. However broad Congress' power under 5, the Court continued, it is not unlimited. The Court explained that "the design of the Amendment and the text of 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States." Id. at 519, 117 S.Ct. 2157. Congress is limited to "enforcing" the rights guaranteed by the Amendment. Id. The Court recognized that while the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies, the distinction exists and must be observed. There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Id. at 519-20, 117 S.Ct. 2157. The Court then examined the provisions of RFRA to determine if it was a valid exercise of Congress' 5 powers. The parties presented RFRA as a measure to "prevent and remedy laws which are enacted with the unconstitutional object of targeting religious beliefs and practices." Id. at 529, 117 S.Ct. 2157. The Court stated that "the appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil presented. Strong measures appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one." Id. at 530, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966)). According to the Court, RFRA's legislative record lacked examples of instances in which laws of general applicability were enacted by the States for the purpose of inflicting religious discrimination. Rather, congressional hearings had focused on laws of general applicability that placed only incidental burdens on religion. The lack of a legislative record, however, was not dispositive. The Court stated that regardless of the state of the legislative record, RFRA cannot be considered remedial, preventive legislation, if those terms are to have any meaning. RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. Id. at 532, 117 S.Ct. 2157. In City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), the Supreme Court reiterated that Congress could not overrule the Court's decisions as to the substantive meaning of the Constitution. 117 S. Ct. at 2168. In City of Boerne, the Court definitively laid to rest fears of too broad congressional power. The Court rejected the so-called "ratchet" theory reading of Morgan, which maintained that Congress could expand (but not contract) the substantive rights created by section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, even where the Court had already explicitly rejected such rights. See 117 S. Ct. at 2168. At the same time, the Court took pains to reaffirm the broad nature of congressional enforcement power under section 5: "legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States. '" 117 S. Ct. at 2163. Observing that "the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern, and that Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies," the Court instructed that "there must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end." 117 S. Ct. at 2164. First, the Court examined Religious Freedoms Reformation Act of 1993 (RFRA) for congruence, ultimately determining that there was no factual basis for supposing a widespread practice of unconstitutional conduct in violation of the Free Expression Clause and finding that the statute violated Separation of Powers principles. See id. at 2171-72. Second, the Court examined the statute for proportionality, concluding that RFRA was over-inclusive in its requirement that courts subject to strict scrutiny all state action alleged to violate free exercise of religion. An aspect of the Court's proportionality inquiry turned on the degree to which RFRA undermined principles of federalism. See id. The City of Boerne Supreme Court reemphasized the broad scope of Congress' section 5 power: "Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional power." Id. In City of Boerne the Court suggested that a bellwether of "congruence" is whether Congress can justify the use of preventative rules by showing that they are appropriate remedial measures. See 117 S. Ct. at 2169. In City of Boerne, the Supreme Court found RFRA to violate the proportionality requirement because "sweeping coverage ensures its intrusion at every level of government." Moreover, the "substantial costs RFRA exacts, both in practical terms of imposing a heavy litigation burden on the States and in terms of curtailing their traditional regulatory power, far exceed any pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct." Id. at 2171.