In City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989), the Court considered a section 1983 action brought against the city of Canton, Ohio when city police officers arrested the plaintiff but failed to obtain proper medical care for her. In Harris, the Court held that the city could be held liable under section 1983, but that there must be a direct causal link between an established city policy or procedure and the due process violation that resulted. See Harris, 109 S.Ct. at 1203. Harris' action was based on the allegation that the city's policy toward officer training caused the officers to violate her rights. The decision in Harris, therefore, turned on whether the city's failure to train its officers met the level of culpability necessary for its failure to rise to the level of a due process violation. As to what level of culpability applied, the Court held that a municipality's failure to train must amount to "deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact." Id. at 1204. In City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1204, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989), the Court rejected the contention that a municipality can be held liable under Sec. 1983 only if a municipal policy is itself unconstitutional. However, in so holding, the Court formulated a stringent standard for plaintiffs to satisfy in order to establish municipal liability. The Court stated that the inadequate police training alleged in Canton may serve as a basis for Sec. 1983 liability only if the failure to train amounts to "deliberate indifference" to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact. Id. The Court remanded the case because the standard of proof the district court imposed on the plaintiff--that of gross negligence or recklessness--was a "lesser one" than the "deliberate indifference" standard. Id. at 109 S.Ct. at 1207. The Court reasoned that the "deliberate indifference" standard was most consistent with its previous declarations that a municipality can be liable under Sec. 1983 only if its policies are the moving force behind a constitutional violation. Id. at 109 S.Ct. at 1204-05. In Canton, the Court set forth certain principles to help expand upon the meaning of the "deliberate indifference" standard of fault. For instance, the Court stated that: it may happen that in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need. 489 U.S. at 109 S.Ct. at 1205. In addition, the Court made clear that it will not: suffice to prove that an injury or accident could have been avoided if an officer had had better or more training, sufficient to equip him to avoid the particular injury-causing conduct. Such a claim could be made about almost any encounter resulting in injury, yet not condemn the adequacy of the program to enable officers to respond properly to the usual and recurring situations with which they must deal. Id. at 109 S.Ct. at 1206. In City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989), he Supreme Court recognized that in limited circumstances the failure to train can form the basis for governmental liability under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. However, the governmental entity itself, by its failure, must have caused the alleged constitutional violation. Id. at 385 (respondeat superior or vicarious liability are not available under Sec. 1983). Where the entity's inaction is the alleged source of the injury, liability will attach only if that inaction amounts to deliberate indifference to the deprivation of the constitutional right involved. Id. at 388. Under Canton, there are two ways in which the entity's failure to train can meet the above standard. First, deliberate indifference can be shown if, in light of the duties assigned to specific employees, the need for more or different training is so obvious and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights that the entity can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need for such training. Id. at 390 and n.10 (obvious need to train police officers in the use of deadly force).; Cornfield by Lewis v. Consolidated High School Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1327 (7th Cir. 1993). Second, deliberate indifference can be shown where the need is not necessarily obvious, but the pattern or frequency of constitutional violations would put the entity on notice that its employees' responses to a recurring situation are insufficient to protect the constitutional rights involved. Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10; Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1327. I n other words, the entity must have acquiesced in a pattern of constitutional violations. Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1327. Under either theory, a plaintiff must prove that the identified deficiency in training actually caused the ultimate injury. Canton, 489 U.S. at 391.