In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985), the Supreme Court invalidated under rational basis review a local zoning ordinance barring the construction of a home for the mentally disabled in a certain neighborhood. The Court successively discounted the city's offered justifications, noting in several cases that if the city were really concerned about the ills that they claimed (overcrowded dwellings), they could have passed better-tailored regulations without the suspicious side-effect of keeping the mentally disabled out of neighborhoods (zoning regulations regarding the number of residents that were generally applicable). Id. at 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442-46, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985), the Supreme Court declined to treat the mentally retarded as a suspect class, observing that disability may legitimately be taken into account by the States in a wide range of situations. Although race and gender distinctions rarely constituted justifiable grounds for differential treatment, see id. at 440-41, 105 S.Ct. 3249, the Court explained: Those who are mentally retarded have a reduced ability to cope with and function in the everyday world. ... They are thus different, immutably so, in relevant respects, and the States' interest in dealing with and providing for them is plainly a legitimate one.... Legislation singling out the retarded for special treatment reflects the real and undeniable differences between the retarded and others. That a civilized and decent society expects and approves such legislation indicates that governmental consideration of those differences in the vast majority of situations is not only legitimate but also desirable. Id. at 442-44, 105 S.Ct. 3249. In other words, "the wide variation in the abilities and needs of the retarded themselves means governmental bodies must have a certain amount of flexibility and freedom from judicial oversight in shaping and limiting their remedial efforts." Id. at 445, 105 S.Ct. 3249. Noting that federal and state governments had recently responded to the needs of the mentally retarded, the Court concluded that disabled individuals did not constitute a powerless class, id. at 443-46, 105 S.Ct. 3249, and declined to presume that any classification drawn on the basis of disability was rooted in unconstitutional discrimination, id. at 446, 105 S.Ct. 3249.