In Clark, v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 125 S.Ct. 716, 160 L.Ed.2d 734 (2005), the Supreme Court was called upon to consider whether its decision in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) was also applicable to aliens in the first category of 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(6). Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia explained that "the operative language of 1231(a)(6), `may be detained beyond the removal period,' applies without differentiation to all three categories of aliens that are its subject" and that "to give these same words a different meaning for each category would be to invent a statute rather than interpret one." Id. at 378, 125 S.Ct. 716. In Clark, the Court considered the precise question of whether the statutory construction of 1231(a)(6) put forward in Zadvydas applies categorically to all classes of aliens covered by the statute whether or not the circumstances raise the same constitutional concerns. 543 U.S. at 378-79, 125 S.Ct. at 723. The Clark court held that because the text of 1231(a)(6), on its face, provides no distinction between the classes of aliens it covers, even in light of varying constitutional concerns, there was no justification for giving the same detention provision a different meaning. Id. at 380-81, 125 S.Ct. at 724. The Court was unequivocal that based on the statutory text, 1231(a)(6) must be interpreted consistently, without exception. Id. Thus, based on the clear language of Clark, this Court must conclude that the presumptive six-month period established in Zadvydas is applicable to all categories of aliens covered by the statute. Id. at 386, 125 S.Ct. 716.