In Cohens v. Virginia (1821) 19 U.S. 264, the State that began criminal proceedings against the Cohenses. The Supreme Court was deciding whether the Supreme Court had the power under the Constitution to review Virginia's Supreme Court's rulings in a criminal proceeding. After deciding that it did have that power, it found the Virginia Supreme Court properly had adjudicated the Defendants. (Id. at 448.) Chief Justice Marshall impressively said: "It is most true, that this court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction, if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure, because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by, because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution. Questions may occur, which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty." The Chief Justice interpreted the effect of Article III on the Court's jurisdiction to review an appeal involving, as parties, a State and a citizen of the same State. The State of Virginia was sued for a writ of error in the United States Supreme Court. The writ challenged a criminal conviction obtained in a Virginia state court. The Court rejected the State's contention that the Constitution denied federal jurisdiction over the appeal. It concluded that Article III provides federal jurisdiction "to all federal-question cases without making in its terms any exception whatever, and without any regard to the condition of party."(Id., at 378.) The Chief Justice then considered whether, in the face of Article III's clear language, a general principle of state sovereign immunity could be implied. He concluded: "From this general grant of jurisdiction in federal-question cases, no exception is made of those cases in which a State may be a party. When we consider the situation of the government of the Union and of a State, in relation to each other; the nature of our constitution; the subordination of the state governments to that constitution; the great purpose for which jurisdiction over all cases arising under the constitution and laws of the United States, is confided to the judicial department; are we at liberty to insert in this general grant, an exception of those cases in which a State may be a party? Will the spirit of the constitution justify this attempt to control its words? We think it will not. We think a case arising under the constitution or laws of the United States, is cognizable in the Courts of the Union, whoever may be the parties to that case". (Id., at 382-383.) Chief Justice Marshall explained in detail the effect of the general principle of sovereign immunity on the scope of Article III: "The Counsel for the State . . . have laid down the general proposition, that a sovereign independent state is not suable except by its own consent. "This general proposition will not be controverted. But its consent is not requisite in each particular case. It may be given in a general law. And if a state has surrendered any portion of its sovereignty, the question whether a liability to suit be a part of this portion, depends on the instrument by which the surrender is made. If, upon a just construction of that instrument, it shall appear that the state has submitted to be sued, then it has parted with this sovereign right of judging in every case on the justice of its own pretensions, and has entrusted that power to a tribunal in whose impartiality it confides." Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat., at 380. The Court in Cohens also clearly revealed its understanding that the Eleventh Amendment was inapplicable to a suit brought by a citizen against his or her own State. After concluding that the petition for a writ of error was not properly understood as a suit commenced or prosecuted against a State, the Chief Justice stated an alternative holding: "But should we in this be mistaken, the error does not affect the case now before the Court. If this writ of error be a suit in the sense of the 11th amendment, it is not a suit commenced or prosecuted `by a citizen of another State, or by a citizen or subject of any foreign State.' It is not then within the amendment, but is governed entirely by the constitution as originally framed, and we have already seen, that in its origin, the judicial power was extended to all cases arising under the constitution or laws of the United States, without respect to parties." (Id., at 412.)The Court said: "A case which arises under a law of the United States must, we are likewise told, be a right given by some act which becomes necessary to execute the powers given in the Constitution. A case in law or equity consists of the right of the one party, as well as of the other, and may truly be said to arise under the Constitution or a law of the United States, whenever its correct decision depends on the construction of either."