In Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972), a defendant who was first convicted and fined ten dollars in a justice court exercised his right to appeal his conviction through a trial de novo in a court of general jurisdiction, where he was once again convicted and fined a sum of fifty dollars. Id. at 107-08. On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's argument that the larger fine imposed during his trial de novo violated the constitutional protections outlined in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). See Colten, 407 U.S. at 108. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision. Id. at 120. The Court acknowledged that Pearce forbids the imposition of a greater punishment following a successful appeal but rejected the assertion that the Kentucky system was infirm simply because the trial de novo judge was able to impose a harsher sentence than that imposed by the justice court. Id. at 115-17. More importantly, the Court also rejected in dicta the contention that the Pearce protections were needed "to minimize an asserted unfairness to criminal defendants who must endure a trial in an inferior justice court with less-than-adequate protections in order to secure a trial comporting completely with constitutional guarantees." Id. at 118. The Court was unpersuaded that the Kentucky system "disadvantaged defendants any more or any less than trials conducted in a court of general jurisdiction in the first instance," explaining as follows: "Proceedings in the inferior courts are simple and speedy, and, if the results in the defendant's case are any evidence, the penalty is not characteristically severe. Such proceedings offer a defendant the opportunity to learn about the prosecution's case and, if he chooses, he need not reveal his own. He may also plead guilty without a trial and promptly secure a de novo trial in a court of general criminal jurisdiction. He cannot, and will not, face the realistic threat of a prison sentence in the inferior court without having the help of counsel, whose advice will also be available in determining whether to seek a new trial, with the slate wiped clean, or to accept the penalty imposed by the inferior court." (Id. at 118-19.) The Court further explained that "in reality, a defendant's choices are to accept the decision of the judge and the sentence imposed in the inferior court or to reject what in effect is no more than an offer in settlement of his case and seek the judgment of judge or jury in the superior court, with sentence to be determined by the full record made in that court." (Id. at 119.) Thus, Colten concluded that the Kentucky two-tier justice court system was not unconstitutional. Under the Kentucky system, a defendant convicted in a justice court proceeding who requested a new trial within the specified statutory time frame was guaranteed an absolute right to a trial de novo in a court of general criminal jurisdiction. Id. at 112-13. If a defendant sought a new trial, the Kentucky system essentially wiped the slate clean by vacating the defendant's sentence. The prosecution and defense would begin anew and the trial de novo would be in no way bound by the justice court's findings or judgment. Id. at 113. In other words, the case would be regarded exactly as if it had been brought in the court of general jurisdiction in the first instance. Id. In Colten v. Kentucky, the Court refused to apply the presumption when the increased sentence was imposed by the second court in a two-tiered system which gave a defendant convicted of a misdemeanor in an inferior court the right to trial de novo in a superior court. We observed that the trial de novo represented a "completely fresh determination of guilt or innocence" by a court that was not being "asked to do over what it thought it had already done correctly." Id., at 117, 92 S. Ct. at 1960. If the de novo trial resulted in a greater penalty, we said that "it no more follows that such a sentence is a vindictive penalty ... than that the inferior court imposed a lenient penalty." Ibid. Consequently, we rejected the proposition that greater penalties on retrial were explained by vindictiveness "with sufficient frequency to warrant the imposition of a prophylactic rule." Id., at 116, 92 S. Ct., at 1960.