Congress is authorized under the commerce clause to regulate the railroads. (City of Auburn v. U.S. Government, 154 F.3d at p. 1029.) The Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized the preclusive effect of federal legislation in this area. (Ibid.) The federal courts have also found broad preemption under the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act. (Id. at p. 1030.) "Preemption of state law is compelled if Congress' command is explicitly stated in the federal statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure or purpose." (Id. at p. 1031; Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1983) 463 U.S. 85, 95 103 S. Ct. 2890, 2899, 77 L. Ed. 2d 490.) But according to the federal House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, "in passing the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, Congress meant to 'occupy the entire field of economic regulation of the interstate rail transportation system,' but retain for the states 'the police powers reserved by the Constitution.' H.R.Rep. No. 104-311, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., at 95-96 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 793, 807-08." ( City of Auburn v. U.S. Government, 154 F.3d at p. 1029.)