In D'Arcy v. Ketchum (1850) 52 U.S. 165, an action had been brought in that State by Morris Ketchum against George H. Gossip and James D'Arcy, joint debtors, on a judgment recovered in New York in 1846. D'Arcy had not been served with process in New York, and he was a resident of Louisiana. A statute of New York was proven which provided that, where joint debtors were sued and one was brought into court on process, he should answer to the plaintiff who might have judgment and execution, not only against the party brought into court, but also against other joint debtors named in the original process, in the same manner as if they had all been brought into courtby virtue of such process; but that it should not be lawful to issue or execute any such execution against the body or against the sole property of any person not brought into court. The effect of that statute was declared by the court to be, that in New York the judgment was valid and binding on an absent defendant as prima facie evidence of the debt, but reserving to him the right to enter into the merits when sued on it and show that he ought not to have been charged, but that the New York judgment had no force or vigor beyond the local jurisdiction. An express limitation was put upon it, and it was held that such a judgment was not entitled to any faith or credit as affecting D'Arcy outside of the State in which it was rendered. In that case, it was contended, that by the Constitution of the United States, and the act of Congress passed May 26, 1790, in relation to the proof and effect of judgments in other States, the judgment in question ought to have the same force and effect in every other State which it had in New York. But the Supreme Court decided that the act of Congress was intended to prescribe only the effect of judgments where the court by which they were rendered had jurisdiction; and that, by international law, a judgment rendered in one State, assuming to bind the person of a citizen of another, was void within the foreign State, if the defendant had not been served with process, or voluntarily made defence, because neither the legislative jurisdiction nor that of the courts of justice had binding force. In sum: The Supreme Court considered a New York judgment in a suit against a partnership was good against all partners so long as one was served. Despite the plain language of the May 26, 1790 Act, the Court held that the New York judgment need not be enforced by a federal court sitting in Louisiana against a partner not served in New York. All that was intended by the 1790 Congress, the Court reasoned, was to codify settled principles of international law - comity - which did not require recognition of the effect of the New York statute.