Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc

In Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975), the Court addressed an action brought by three separate corporations that each operated a bar featuring topless dancing. After a town enacted an ordinance prohibiting such dancing, each bar complied with the ordinance but filed a federal action challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. One day after filing their federal complaint, however, one of the three bars resumed topless dancing. Accordingly, it and several individual dancers were served with criminal summonses. The other two bars did not resume topless dancing until after the federal court issued a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court ruled that all three plaintiffs should not automatically be thrown into the same hopper for Younger purposes. Id. at 928. While there plainly may be some circumstances in which legally distinct parties are so closely related that they should all be subject to the Younger considerations which govern any one of them, this is not such a case. Id. at 928-29. We thus think that each of the respondents should be placed in the position required by our cases as if that respondent stood alone. Id. at 929 (reversing grant of preliminary injunctive relief to the one bar against which state-court criminal proceedings had been initiated, but affirming grant of injunctive relief with respect to the other two for which no state-court proceedings were pending when they filed their federal complaint). In sum, in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., three bartenders faced with a local ordinance prohibiting topless dancing filed federal challenges to the constitutionality of the ordinance. One bartender violated the ordinance and was prosecuted. Id. at 925, 95 S.Ct. 2561. The other two did not. Id. at 924-25, 95 S.Ct. 2561. The Court held that Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971) barred the claim of the prosecuted bartender, but not the claims of the other bartenders. It added, however, that "there plainly may be some circumstances in which legally distinct parties are so closely related that they should all be subject to the Younger considerations which govern any one of them." Id. at 928, 95 S.Ct. 2561.